The University of Southern Mississippi

The Aquila Digital Community
Dissertations
Fall 12-2014

The Effects of Language Complexity on Natural and Emotion
Concept Formation in Early Language Learners
Stephanie Eileen Jett
University of Southern Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations
Part of the Child Psychology Commons, and the Educational Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Jett, Stephanie Eileen, "The Effects of Language Complexity on Natural and Emotion Concept Formation
in Early Language Learners" (2014). Dissertations. 768.
https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations/768

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more
information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.

The University of Southern Mississippi

THE EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE COMPLEXITY ON NATURAL AND EMOTION
CONCEPT FORMATION IN EARLY LANGUAGE LEARNERS

by
Stephanie Eileen Jett

Abstract of a Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2014

ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE COMPLEXITY ON NATURAL AND EMOTION
CONCEPT FORMATION IN EARLY LANGUAGE LEARNERS
by Stephanie Eileen Jett
December 2014
The present study investigated the role of language complexity in natural and
emotion concept formation ability in young children (two- to five-year-olds). Language
complexity was measured by selections from the Brigance Diagnostic Inventory of Early
Childhood Development II, and concept formation was assessed at three levels of
abstraction. The natural concepts were presented as two alternative discriminations on a
touch-screen computer, as follows: subordinate level (lions versus tigers), basic level
(cats versus dogs), and superordinate level (animals versus nonanimals). The following
emotion categories were discriminated: subordinate level (anger versus sadness), basic
level (positive [happiness and positive surprise] versus negative [anger and sadness], and
superordinate level (emotions [happiness, surprise, anger, and sadness] and neutral faces).
It was predicted that higher language complexity scores would be related to higher
performance on the concept discrimination tasks. Results showed no support for the
language as an augmenter hypothesis, providing some support for the assertion that
concept formation is an innate ability, not dependent upon language. Additionally, there
was no support found for the Circumplex model of emotion recognition with performance
on the subordinate and superordinate level of abstraction tasks exceeding that on the
basic level discrimination. Interestingly, results indicated that females outperformed
males on the emotion concept discriminations, suggesting possible differences in
ii

socialization between male and female children and/or an evolutionary predisposition for
females to interpret facial expressions more accurately than males from an earlier age.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Humans exist in a highly complex perceptual environment and are constantly
exposed to information that must be processed. In the case of infants and very young
children, the vast majority of information encountered is novel and must be processed
and stored in memory for later use. Familiar, as well as novel, information is organized
into units in order to reduce the amount of information that has to be processed, stored,
and later recalled; these units are termed concepts (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, &
Boyes-Braem, 1976). Concepts are mental representations of information formed during
the process of categorization.
One mechanism that has been hypothesized to underlie the sorting of information
into groups during categorization is of the analysis of shared features. These features
could be observable, such as common physical features, or unobservable, such as warm
versus cold-blooded. The concepts that result from the process of categorization could be
physical concepts, which include natural categories (e.g., animals), or social concepts,
such as concepts for processing and detecting emotions. The exact manner in which these
concepts are formed and utilized by the organism has remained a topic of interest for the
past several decades (Gelman & Markman, 1987; Markman & Wisniewski, 1997; Quinn
& Tanaka, 2007; Rosch, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976).
Language Affects Cognition
Language has been suggested to influence concept formation throughout
development (Davidoff, 2001; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Markman, 1987;
Mandler, 1992; Plunkett, Hu, & Cohen, 2008; Russell & Widen, 2002; Yoshida & Smith,
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2005; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998) and is a mechanism by which highly complex cognitive
abilities are molded and made possible (Wolff & Holmes, 2011; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998).
Wolff and Holmes (2011) point out that although it is currently recognized and accepted
that thought is a separate entity from language (that is, they are not inextricably linked),
the extent to which language shapes thought is still highly debated (Davidoff, 2001;
Franklin, Clifford, Williamson, & Davies, 2005; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, &
Levinson, 2004; Plunkett et al., 2008; Russell & Widen, 2002; Saalbach & Imai, 2007).
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
One popular hypothesis that seeks to explain the role of language in cognition is
the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. Originally, this hypothesis suggested that the language one
speaks governs how that person thinks, making some ways of thinking possible and some
impossible depending upon the structure of the language one speaks. In other words,
language determines cognition, implying that cultures that speak different languages will
think inherently differently. This version of the hypothesis has become known as
Linguistic Determinism and is considered the strong version (Wolff & Holmes, 2011).
Evidence supporting this approach comes from work with human infants showing
that, up until the age of approximately six months, infants can recognize and distinguish
all phonemes present in all languages. However, between the ages of six to nine months,
this ability begins to disappear and is completely gone by the age of approximately
twelve months. The child is left with the ability to distinguish and recognize only the
phonemes present in their native language (Werker & Desjardins, 1995). This auditory
specialization alludes to the possible importance of the language that one is exposed to
before being capable of producing language.
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Further support for linguistic determinism has been found in research involving
the categorization of colors. Davidoff (2001) found that the categorization of colors
differed between speakers of English and Berinmo (Papua New Guinea). These results
suggest that the linguistic terms used for different colors in a particular culture can affect
how we categorize colors, perhaps even how we perceive colors (Davidoff, 2001).
However, the empirical support for Linguistic Determinism is not conclusive. Many
argue that language may have an impact on thought, but its role is less deterministic and
more augmentative in nature (Wolff & Holmes, 2011).
A weaker version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the Linguistic Relativity
Hypothesis (LRH), has gained more empirical support. The LRH suggests that language
shapes thought by making some ways of thinking easier and some more difficult based
on the structure of the language one speaks (Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell,
2006). LRH and Linguistic Determinism differ in that the strong version comes very
close to stating that thought is impossible without language and the LRH simply dilutes
Linguistic Determinism. The LRH implies that, while thought may be possible without
language, this form of thought is inherently different than thought that occurs with
language. However, the LRH still implies that speakers of different languages inherently
think and perceive the world differently (Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). Empirical support for
the LRH has been reported in research on color categorization and perception (Masharov
& Fischer, 2006; Thierry, Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009; Winawer
et al., 2007), spatial frames of reference (Gallistel, 2002; Majid et al., 2004), concepts of
time (Boroditsky, 2001), numerical processing (Pixner, Moeller, Hermanova, Nuerk, &
Kaufmann, 2011), and most importantly for the current project, categorization and
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concept formation ( Gelman & Markman, 1987; Plunkett et al., 2008; Yoshida & Smith,
2005; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998) and the perception of emotion (Lindquist et al., 2006;
Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003).
Wolff and Holmes (2011) suggest, however, that the interaction between language
and thought is more complex than can be explained by just a strong or weak version of
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The authors assert that whereas Linguistic Determinism has
not been empirically supported, several other manifestations of the LRH have been
hypothesized with reasonable supporting evidence to be discussed in the following
sections.
Thought with and after language
Despite the lack of empirical support for Linguistic Determinism and the debates
regarding the role of language in shaping thought, it would be difficult to consider the
idea that language plays no role at all in shaping human cognition. If language provided
no benefit or advantage, the mechanisms to produce and comprehend it would likely not
have been preserved in the evolution of the species, nor would they continue to be
utilized by human cultures. Wolff and Holmes (2011) suggest that thought occurs both
with and after language. Thought with language occurs when thought and language work
simultaneously, or online. Whereas, thought after language occurs when language directs
attention (e.g., priming) to relevant aspects of the environment or influences the type of
processing utilized during tasks, even if the tasks are nonverbal in nature (Wolff &
Holmes, 2011).
As depicted in Figure 1, when thought is occurring after language, there are two
proposed roles that language could play: language as a spotlight and language as an
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inducer (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). In a perceptual world as complex as the one in which
humans exist, language may function to highlight certain relevant features in order to
help reduce the amount of information that is necessary to process at one time. In this
role, language may act as a spotlight to aid in focusing attention to aspects of the
environment made more salient by the exposure to and use of a language. Supporting
evidence for this role of language has been demonstrated in research regarding how
language affects spatial frames of reference and relations (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). For
instance, English speakers emphasize the difference between prepositions indicating
support (e.g., The lamp was placed on the table) and those indicating containment (e.g.,
The lamp was placed in the box). In contrast, Korean speakers emphasize the distinction
between tight and loose fit in their placement verbs while the distinction between
containment and support is irrelevant. Interestingly, like phoneme sensitivity early in
infancy, very young infants in both cultures are sensitive to all distinctions but become
more specialized as they are exposed to their native languages, suggesting language
acting as a spotlight to draw attention to the relevant spatial distinctions for their
language (Choi, 2006).
In addition, varying linguistic descriptions of an object’s position relative to
another object has been shown to lead to differences in non-linguistic representations
(e.g., gestures) of these spatial relationships from culture to culture (Gallistel, 2002;
Majid et al., 2004). For instance, speakers of a language who would describe the position
of a building as to the right of a statue differ in the way that they would non-linguistically
demonstrate (e.g., by gesturing) where the building was in relation to the statue,
compared to speakers of a language who predominantly would use a frame of reference
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stating that the building was north of the statue (depending upon cardinal direction)
(Majid et al., 2004). However, that is not to say that the way in which one’s language
refers to spatial relationships makes thinking in any other frame of reference impossible.
Language is in this case acting as a spotlight, making certain ways to view the spatial
world easier than others (Gallistel, 2002).
Language is also hypothesized to act as an inducer, making one type of
processing preferred over another when confronted with a task. Wolff and Holmes (2011)
suggest that “language may prime a particular mode of processing that continues to be
engaged even after language is no longer in use” (p. 260). In other words, language may
act at an unconscious level that shapes how speakers perceive their environment (Thierry
et al., 2009). Though most often research on color perception is spoken of in regard to
language acting with thought in an online sense, recent findings suggest that the language
one speaks functions to induce early, low-level perception of colors. Thierry and
colleagues (2009) found that, for native Greek speakers, the cortical response (visual
mismatch negativity) that is an indicator of preattentive (unconscious) change detection
was greater for discriminating between light and dark blue. The authors suggest that this
effect is due to the existence of two color terms in the Greek language that refer to that
discrimination. In contrast, native English speakers did not show this cortical response,
indicating that the existence of the two color terms in the Greek language acted as an
inducer for detecting the differences between the colors for native Greek speakers, even
when those terms were not being consciously utilized.
Additional evidence for language as an inducer comes from research on how time
is conceptualized by speakers of differing languages. When speakers of Mandarin
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Chinese were asked to confirm if a target month came before a comparison month (e.g.,
March before April), they were quicker to do so if they had seen an array of objects
aligned vertically, which matches how they typically conceptualize time, versus if the
array of objects was aligned horizontally, which is how English speakers typically
conceptualize time. The opposite is true for English speakers, suggesting that the way in
which someone typically speaks can influence how someone thinks about abstract
concepts like time (Boroditsky, 2001). These results, however, have been heavily
criticized due to the fact that they have failed to replicate in Mandarin/Chinese and
English speakers using the same methods (January & Kako, 2007) or similar (Tse &
Altarriba, 2008). Similar results have been shown in nonverbal number processing in
young children (German versus English speakers), suggesting that the processing of place
values in non-verbal, digital representations of numbers is nonetheless affected by the
way in which the number words system is structured (Pixner et al., 2011). Like the
findings regarding spatial relationships, the suggestion that nonverbal numerical
processing is shaped by language has also been challenged. Brysbaert, Fias, and Noel
(1998) found that when modality of response is controlled (verbal versus typed), the
differences between languages disappear.
Though some of the evidence for the language after thought hypothesis is
controversial, there are additional ways in which language has been suggested to shape
thought when the two are working in tandem – thought with language. For example,
Wolff and Holmes (2011) suggest that language may work with thought in two ways
(refer to Figure 1): language as a meddler and language as an augmenter. In these two
hypothesized roles, language can both help (augment) and/or hinder (meddle with)
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cognition. When language acts as a meddler, linguistic codes interfere in some way with
non-linguistic codes, affecting the way in which one perceives the environment (e.g.,
color-perception). From a Whorfian perspective, even aspects of perception that one
would assume to be relatively universal and biological in nature, such as colorperception, are affected by one’s language at each stage in the process. Therefore,
without a word for a specific color or shade of a color, it is possible that the observer
does not in fact perceive the color in the same manner that a person with a specific label
for that hue does. These results have been demonstrated by several researchers (Davidoff,
2001; Davies, Sowden, Jerrett, Jerrett, & Corbett, 1998; Masharov & Fischer, 2006;
Winawer et al., 2007), indicating that the number of available color terms in one’s
language has an effect on the color discrimination of the speakers of the languages.
The above results suggest that the linguistic codes present in one’s language
meddle with the non-linguistic perception of colors (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). However,
these findings may not fully reflect the breadth of the issue. The effects of language could
have more of an impact only later in life, after significant exposure to one’s native
language, and have less of an effect earlier in life (Franklin et al., 2005). Whereas
language appears to indeed shape the way in which individuals perceive color, there also
exist universal properties of colors (e.g., light and dark) that allow for overlap among
speakers of differing languages, demonstrated by a similar number of basic color terms
across many languages (Claidiere, Jraissati, & Chevallier, 2008; Kay & Reiger, 2006).
Lastly, the augmenter hypothesis implies that language in this role supplements
and/or aides thought by providing additional conceptual frameworks by which mental
operations can occur. In essence, language becomes a tool for thought. This role of
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language is of most importance to this proposal due to the function of language in the
formation of concepts in humans (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Language has been implicated
as the game changer for categorical perception in that it highlights commonalities
between members of a category that can be both observable (e.g., perceptual similarities)
and/or unobservable (e.g., internal structures or emotional states) and facilitates concept
formation by providing the organizational, anchoring structure (words) upon which a
concept can be built (Gelman & Markman, 1987; Plunkett et al., 2008; Zhang & Schmitt,
1998). For instance, speakers of languages that utilize nominal classifier systems
(classifies nouns into over 100 semantic categories), such as Chinese, categorize objects
differently than speakers of languages that do not use this system (e.g., utilize shared
perceptual features). Chinese speakers grouped objects based on the structure of the
classifier system (grouping objects together that shared a common classifier), whereas
English speakers did not, suggesting that language facilitated the categorization of the
objects for the Chinese speakers (Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). Labels have even been
deemed capable of overriding perceptually based concepts in early language learning
humans, which provides evidence for the augmenting, and potentially meddling, role
language can play in concept formation (Plunkett et al., 2008).
Beyond perceptual categorization, however, language is proposed to play a
pivotal role in the formation and understanding of social concepts, such as theory of mind
and emotional understanding (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; de Rosnay, Pons, Harris,
& Morrell, 2004; Lindquist et al., 2006; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Russell & Widen,
2002; Watson, Painter, & Bornstein, 2000) due to the inherent internal nature of mental
state attribution. Whereas forming a concept for a subordinate level natural category,
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such as tigers, may be relatively straightforward due to the fact that members of that
category share common observable perceptual features (e.g., stripes), forming a concept
for mental states presents an obstacle because the characteristics that discriminate one
from another are not always reliably displayed externally.
Theory of mind is the understanding that others possess knowledge, intentions,
opinions, and feelings that can differ from those of the self. The development of this
ability has been linked to linguistic ability in young children, with those who are more
advanced linguistically early in development possessing more advanced theory of mind
capabilities later in childhood compared to others in their age groups (Astington &
Jenkins, 1999; Watson et al., 2000). This relationship is especially true for the
understanding of false beliefs, perhaps due to the inherently embedded structure of a false
belief statement (e.g., I know X is really true, but she thinks Y). The understanding of
such statements could be facilitated by knowledge and understanding of the grammatical
structure (syntax) of one’s language (Wolff & Holmes, 2011).
Of marked importance to the current project is the potential effect of language on
the development of emotion understanding and recognition, specifically. Emotions are
internal, psychological states, which create a challenge in terms of studying how emotion
concepts are formed and how emotions are recognized by early language learners. For
humans, one way in which this challenge may be overcome is by utilizing facial
expressions to determine emotional states. Facial expressions are interpreted by
perceivers as outward, externalized expressions of internal emotional states. Both a crosscultural, innate, universality of emotion recognition hypothesis (e.g., Ekman, 1993; Izard,
1994; Waller, Cray, & Burrows, 2008) and a LRH explanation of emotion recognition
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(e.g., Lindquist et al., 2006; Russell & Widen, 2002) have been explored with support for
both a universal and relativistic approach to emotion recognition. The suggested role of
language as an augmenter in this case, however, is hypothesized as providing a label for
unobservable or difficult to discriminate emotional states (Russell & Bullock, 1985;
Russell & Widen, 2002).
If language and thought are as deeply connected as the aforementioned findings
suggest, then the question still remains as to what it is about language that causes
language to exert influence on cognitive abilities. The affected abilities could include
emotion recognition and natural concept formation, especially in early language learners.
Human language is a complex system of communication that is comprised of
significantly more than merely producing and understanding individual words in
isolation. This fact alludes to not only the potential role of both expressive and receptive
language, but also to the role of other aspects of language (e.g. grammatical competency
and practical use/comprehension of language) in affecting the way in which one
perceives and thinks about the world. Additionally, is language necessary for concept
formation or does it simply help anchor concepts when it is present and is therefore only
a sufficient condition for concept formation? Exploring such questions first necessitates
the discussion of the theoretical and developmental bases of both natural and emotion
concept formation.
Natural Concept Formation
Concepts are defined as mental representations of information utilized to reduce
the amount of information that needs to be processed, stored, and later recalled. These
concepts are formed during the process of categorization. Categories can either be well-
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defined or ill-defined in terms of their structures. Well-defined categories, such as
experimentally derived categories, are characterized by possessing a “set of separately
necessary and jointly sufficient features” that distinguish one category from another
(Bhatt, Wasserman, Reynolds, & Knauss, 1988, p. 219). Needless to say, these types of
clearly organized categories are rarely found in nature. Natural categories, unlike welldefined categories, have what are termed as fuzzy boundaries, meaning that there is
considerable overlap between and among categories, therefore, making natural categories
ill-defined (Bhatt et al., 1988). The fact that natural categories (e.g., animals) do not have
clear-cut boundaries creates unique challenges for the process of forming concepts for
these types of categories. The following sections will describe the theories of conceptual
structure, the order in which the different levels of concepts emerge, the information very
young children utilize as a basis upon which to form concepts, and finally, a discussion
on the hypothesized role that language plays in the formation and organization of natural
concepts.
Concept Theory
Concepts are utilized to reduce the amount of information regarding category
membership that needs to be processed, stored, and retrieved. The way in which
organisms structure these concepts has been a topic of interest for decades due to the fact
that natural categories, such as animals or plants, are ill-defined (Gelman & Markman,
1987; Markman & Wisniewskie, 1997; Quinn & Tanaka, 2007; Rosch, 1975; Rosch et
al., 1976). So, how do we structure concepts for natural categories? One of the most
popular views is that concepts are formed in a hierarchical manner based on what have
been termed levels of abstraction (Rosch et al., 1976).
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Rosch’s levels of abstraction. Rosch and colleagues (1976) proposed that natural
categories are organized around three levels of abstraction, from least to most inclusive:
subordinate, basic, and superordinate. The three levels are differentiated by level of
between and within category inclusiveness, or similarity. It is of importance to note that a
natural object can be represented at all three levels of abstraction at once; for example, a
Golden Retriever is simultaneously represented at the superordinate level of animal, the
basic level of dog, and the subordinate level of its own breed. This ability to flexibly
categorize an object at multiple levels of abstraction has been suggested as a hallmark of
human conceptual abilities (Lazareva, Frieburger, & Wasserman, 2004). Subordinate
level categories, being the most exclusive level, have a high degree of both within and
between category similarities (Markman & Wisniewski, 1997; Rosch et al., 1976). For
example, a single breed of dog (e.g., Golden retriever) would be considered to be a
subordinate level category. Two breeds of dogs, for example a Golden retriever and
Border collie (two subordinate level categories), share many attributes both within and
between the subordinate categories.
In contrast, superordinate level categories are considered the most inclusive
categories. Superordinate categories, such as animals, share few common attributes both
within and between categories. For example, both a grasshopper and a Golden retriever
belong to the same superordinate category of animal, but share very few observable
features in common. In addition, between superordinate categories, such as animals and
plants, there are even fewer shared attributes. This level of abstraction has been suggested
to be the level at which true conceptual knowledge regarding category membership is of
utmost importance to the formation of the concept, relative to subordinate categories
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formed on the basis of shared perceptual features (Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 2004),
although others have argued that categories can be discriminated on a perceptual basis
due to the between category dissimilarity (Mandler, 1992; Quinn, 2002; Quinn & Eimas,
1996). More details regarding this argument will be provided in a later section.
Basic level categories balance low between category similarity and an
intermediate level of similarity within categories (Markman & Wisniewskie, 1997; Rosch
et al., 1976). As an example, exemplars within the basic level category of dogs share
many common features within the category, such as head shape, body structure, etc. If
compared to another basic level category of cats, for example, there are fewer attributes
in common than within the two categories, therefore making the two categories highly
differentiated despite being members of the same parent superordinate category of
animals.
Basic level categories have also been suggested to be the most economical in
terms of cognitive resources due to the fact that they possess the most information needed
to differentiate between objects without containing extra, unnecessary information
(Rosch et al., 1976). In explanation, when one moves from a basic to a subordinate level
category, there is little information gained from that differentiation, as determined by the
fewer number of novel facts that can be named for a subordinate level category (e.g.,
Golden retriever) compared to its parent basic level category (e.g., dog). The little
information that is gained (e.g., hair color and length or body size), however, is important
for distinguishing among members of a basic level category.
Along the same vein, when one moves from a basic to a superordinate level
category, the increase in information is not as useful for determining category
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membership in comparison to the information used to describe the basic level categories.
While there is a significant amount of overlap among the characteristics that can be used
to describe animals, dogs, and specific instances of dogs (e.g., they all eat, breathe,
reproduce, etc.), more novel, specific information can be used to describe the basic level
category (dogs) than the subordinate (Golden retriever) or superordinate (animals) level
categories. These assertions regarding the practicality of basic level categories have led to
the proposition that these categories are cognitively privileged. Following Rosch and
colleagues’ (1976) differentiation view, the other levels of abstraction are derived from
basic level categories - subordinate levels are formed by breaking down basic level
categories and superordinate levels are created by grouping together basic level
categories. Basic level categories have been suggested to emerge first in development,
and the labels for members have been shown to be learned and used first by early
language learners (Rosch et al., 1976).
Alignable differences view. As popular as the differentiation view has been since
its first proposal, there are some who assert that this view is underspecified. Critics assert
that Rosch and colleagues (1976) emphasized the commonalities between and among
category members too much and neglected what Markman and Wisniewskie (1997)
propose as alignable differences. Alignable differences arise from shared features of
category members. For a simple example using vehicles, Markman and Wisniewskie
(1997) stated that the fact that most vehicles, with exceptions, have wheels as a
commonality, but the fact that cars have four wheels and motorcycles have two is an
alignable difference. They suggest that these alignable differences play a major role in
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distinguishing between members of categories, especially at the basic and subordinate
level of abstraction.
In contrast to the differentiation view, when contrasting two basic level categories
(e.g., dogs and cats) that originate from the same superordinate level parent (e.g.,
animals), the two categories will share many commonalities (e.g., four legs, heads, tails,
fur, sharp teeth, claws), but differ by having many alignable differences (such as
retractable claws versus stationary claws, differing head shape, etc.). Similarly, two
subordinate level categories (e.g., Golden retrievers and Border collies) that originate
from the same basic level parent (e.g., dogs) will also share many commonalities (e.g.,
similar head structure, dentition, body shape, fur), but differ based on many alignable
differences (e.g., fur color/length/texture, muzzle shape, ear shape). In addition,
subordinate level categories from the same superordinate level parent, but different basic
level parents also share representational structure with each other. Therefore, in contrast
to the differentiation view, when two lower level categories share the same higher level
of abstraction parent, using only the commonalities shared between and within them is
insufficient to determine category membership; one must use both the commonalities and
the alignable differences to help determine category membership at the lower levels of
abstraction (Markman & Wisniewskie, 1997). Both views, however, are of importance
when considering the developmental trajectory of the levels of abstraction in concept
formation.
Order of Emergence – The Developmental Trajectory of Concept Formation
Basic level first hypothesis. As mentioned previously, it has been suggested that
basic level categories are somehow cognitively privileged categories due to the fact that
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they are the level at which “natural groupings of organisms possess bundles of correlated
features and which are obviously different from other organisms” (Rosch et al., 1976, p.
386). In other words, basic level categories balance being highly differentiated from each
other and highly related within each other. This balance and hypothesized cognitive bias
has led to the suggestion that basic level categories are the first level of abstraction at
which infants and children form concepts and continue to be the first accessed concepts
throughout development (Rosch et al., 1976; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991).
For supporters of this view, the basic level emerges first. Superordinate levels are
then formed by grouping together related basic level categories and subordinate levels by
differentiating within the basic level categories (Quinn, 2002, 2004a). Rosch and
colleagues (1976) found that basic level categories remained stable and privileged across
development, from childhood through adulthood. This finding suggests that once formed,
basic level categories will not change in their structure/organization, and a bias toward
accessing category membership at this level remains across development. However, for
both superordinate and subordinate levels, changes occur across the lifespan. Rosch and
colleagues (1976) found that there were developmental changes only for superordinate
level categories. Later research has shown the impact of expertise on the formation of
subordinate level categories, which suggests that one must gather experience with the
more broad members of a basic level category before forming a separate, more specific
subordinate level category (Quinn, 2002, 2004a; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991).
Superordinate level first hypothesis. In contrast, more recent research has
questioned the accuracy of Rosch and colleagues’ (1976) developmental trajectory of
concept formation Whereas basic level concepts may be relatively privileged once
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formed, many researchers have found evidence that it is the more global, superordinate
level concepts that are formed first in development (Lazareva, Soto, & Wasserman, 2010;
Mareschal & Quinn, 2001; Quinn, 2002, 2004a; Quinn & Tanaka, 2007; Rakison &
Butterworth, 1998). Though superordinate categories share fewer within category
similarities, they share many highly discriminable between category differences. For
instance, the most typical exemplars of the superordinate level category of animals can
generally be described, with exceptions of course, as all having legs of some form while
most members of the category of vehicles can be described as having wheels, not legs, of
some form. Whereas, when comparing two basic level categories (e.g., dogs versus cats),
one must rely upon closer inspection of “specific values of similar features” (i.e.,head and
general body shape) to discriminate among members of the different categories (Quinn,
2002, p. 68).
The fact that superordinate level categories possess attributes that are easily
discriminable from one another and are more frequently encountered than basic level
attributes has led to the assertion that this level is first to emerge in development.
Children would be able to make quick category judgments based on the presence or
absence of highly salient attributes for superordinate groupings in comparison to more
precise, detail-based judgments for basic level categories. The developmental trajectory
for subscribers to the global/superordinate level first hypothesis would be that basic level
categories are abstracted from superordinate level categories, and subordinate level
categories would be formed by further subdivisions of the basic level categories
(Mareschal & Quinn, 2001; Quinn, 2002, 2004a; Quinn & Tanaka, 2007). From birth to
two and a half years old, the predominant level of abstraction utilized when making
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category distinctions is the superordinate level (for review see Mareschal & Quinn,
2001). However, what the two aforementioned hypotheses fail to explain is what
information is utilized by the infants/children to form these concepts, regardless of when
they emerge in development.
How Do Very Young Children Form Concepts?
The previous sections have focused on theories regarding what types of concepts
are formed and when the different levels emerge. However, a source of further debate
focuses on how these concepts are formed by very young children (e.g., Cimpian &
Erickson, 2012; Quinn, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Quinn & Eimas, 1996). Is the ability to form
and utilize concepts innate or learned? In addition, what types of information do very
young children utilize when forming early concepts?
Bottom-up concept formation – Perceptual basis of concepts. Some argue that the
ability to form and utilize concepts is an innate ability, emerging as soon as the human
infant is capable of perceiving the structure of their environment (Cimpian & Erickson,
2012; Mandler, 1992). Such a view suggests that infants and very young children
(i.e.,early language learners) are forming these concepts online, or while they are actively
perceiving the environment. Phrased differently, very young children are forming
concepts from the bottom-up, detecting the inherent structure in the world and using that
structure to gather the necessary information to form concepts (Cimpian & Erickson,
2012; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). The information utilized by this bottom-up formation
must be readily available to the infants and children.
Mandler (1992) suggests that the mechanism by which these early concepts are
formed is perceptual analysis. Perceptual analysis is a process in which stimuli in the
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environment that can be readily perceived by the senses (e.g., vision) is analyzed in order
to extract necessary information from the stimuli. That information is then recoded into
mental representations of the meaning of the information, which is then used as the basis
to form accessible concepts. The key to this process of perceptual analysis is that infants
and very young children are using the perceptual features of the stimulus to form the
concepts online, as they perceive their environment. That is, infants and very young
children, who are predisposed to think in terms of concepts, are utilizing the perceptual
information readily available, such as head shape or face structure, to form complex,
abstract mental representations about information in their environments.
But, for subscribers to this line of reasoning, what types of perceptual information
are necessary and/or sufficient in order to form these concepts? If it is information that is
readily perceivable, then the features being utilized must be surface features, such as
coloration or body shape (Quinn, 2002). However, it has been found that for concepts of
animals, information from the head region alone is not only sufficient, but seems to be
necessary in order to form concepts (Quinn & Eimas, 1996). Specific information, such
as the aforementioned, could then be “anchored by multiple static and dynamic
attributes” of the objects (Quinn, 2002, p. 68). Perceptual information can be gathered
after a single exposure to the stimulus, thereby, making perceptual analysis cognitively
economical in terms of preserving cognitive resources for other tasks (Rakison &
Butterworth, 1998).
The assertion that infants and very young children use readily available perceptual
features to form concepts from the bottom-up helps to explain the evidence
demonstrating that they may be predisposed to form more global, superordinate
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categories. Initially, at least, the presence or absence of obvious perceptual features helps
to discriminate between more broad, superordinate categories, such as animals from
nonanimals. For instance, the possession of eyes and self-propelled movement can
distinguish an animal from a non-animal, such as a tree. These very readily apparent
attributes are less likely to help discriminate between basic and subordinate level
category members (Quinn, 2004a; Rakison & Butterworth, 1998). As mentioned
previously, information of this type can be extracted after a single instance, and therefore,
does not necessitate repeated exposures to form concepts, which reserves cognitive
resources for other tasks (Rakison & Butterworth, 1998).
Top-down concept formation – Role of prior experience. In contrast to the
hypothesis that the formation and utilization of concepts is an innate ability, some suggest
that experience with the world is needed in order to form concepts. Those who support
this view suggest that conceptual ability is a late-emerging ability. Thus, infants and very
young children possess not concepts, but percepts, with percepts being perceptuallydriven representations that contain no true conceptual basis. Piaget (1952), for instance,
believed that until the infant is capable of producing mental representations, an ability he
believed did not occur until after the first year and a half of life (late sensorimotor-early
preoperational stage), they were incapable of forming concepts; therefore, any
“conceptual-like” behaviors were merely percepts with the single function of allowing for
identification of stimuli in order to react appropriately in its presence (Mandler, 1992).
The necessity to utilize prior experience and theories created from information previously
gathered from the environment suggests that concepts, in contrast to percepts, are formed
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from the top-down. If present and available, even infants are capable of using prior
knowledge and experience to guide concept formation (Mareschal & Quinn, 2001).
Some evidence for the use of top-down processing in concept formation is the
relatively late emergence of subordinate level categories. It has been suggested that only
after an infant gains exposure to a basic level category can they then abstract more
specific, subordinate level categories (Quinn & Tanaka, 2007; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991).
These findings help explain the effects of expertise on the basic level bias. Tanaka and
Taylor (1991) found that experts on specific basic level categories (birds and dogs),
compared to novices, showed a subordinate level bias by naming more novel attributes
for specific species (subordinate level categories) of birds or dogs than for the basic level
categories as a whole. This pattern is in contrast to the results shown by novices in this
experiment where more novel attributes were named for basic level categories. Rosch and
colleagues’ (1976) pioneering experiment also found that more novel attributes were
named for basic level categories than for subordinate level categories. Only after
experience with the specific category members within a basic or superordinate level
category do subordinate level categories emerge, demonstrating the use of top-down
processing to form these concepts (Quinn & Tanaka, 2007). Perceptual features alone are
not always sufficient to form concepts, suggesting the role of prior experience as one of
importance, even in early concept formation.
In addition, the more abstract categories could also rely heavily upon experience
for their formation. As categories become more abstract, some suggest that the
characteristics that define these categories become less readily apparent by perceptual
analysis, thereby necessitating possession of a more conceptual understanding of

23
category membership. The information utilized to generate this conceptual understanding
may originate from perceptual analysis, but is not directly derived from perceptual
features (Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 2004). The only way to gain this type of conceptual
understanding is through experience with the environment and learning about the more
non-obvious attributes that contribute to category formation (Quinn, 2004b).
Reconciling top-down versus bottom-up processing. From the existing evidence, it
seems prudent to suggest that infants and very young children use both perceptual
features and prior experience to form concepts. What may begin as a primarily
perceptually driven process may develop into conceptual understanding as an individual
gains more and more experience with the environment. More readily perceivable
attributes may be supplemented by information regarding more non-obvious attributes
(e.g., internal structures) through experience and learning. If prior experience is available
to be drawn upon, infants will utilize it, but in its absence, perceptual features could
become more heavily weighted (Mareschal & Quinn, 2001). Existing research suggests
that perceptual and conceptual categorization follow a parallel developmental trajectory
and involve comparable, yet separate, cognitive processing mechanisms (Quinn, 2004a).
What role then does language - one of the most salient human experiences – play
in the development of concepts? If concepts, particularly more abstract concepts, are
formed based on more than perception alone, does experience with one’s native language
impact how concepts are formed in early language learners? In addition, it is possible that
the shift from early, perceptually based percepts to more abstract, theory driven concepts
is facilitated or mediated by the acquisition of language (Gelman & Coley, 1990). The
next section will delve into the impact of language on natural concept formation.
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Language’s Impact on Natural Concepts
As reviewed, there is a vast amount of literature regarding the impact of language
on the perception of the environment. Given the unlikelihood that language has no impact
on cognitive abilities in humans, the question is to what extent does language impact
cognition, particularly natural concept formation? There are those who argue for a strong
version of the LRH (i.e.,Linguistic Determinism), suggesting that the structure of one’s
native language can override perceptual information when forming concepts (Gelman &
Markman, 1987; Plunkett et al., 2008). However, evidence from work with very young
infants, children with autism, deaf children, and nonhumans suggests the possibility that
concept formation is an innate capacity, based in the abstraction of perceptual features,
that does not explicitly depend on language and could have emerged earlier in our
phylogenetic history than previously thought (Bhatt et al., 1988; Cimpian & Erickson,
2012; Fabre-Thorpe, Richard, & Thorpe, 1998; Gasteb, Strauss, & Minshew, 2006;
Lazareva et al., 2004; Lazareva et al., 2010; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988; Vonk, Jett, &
Mosteller, 2012; Vonk, Jett, Mosteller, & Galvan, 2013; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002,
2004). The following sections will investigate the various hypothesized roles that
language plays in concept formation.
LRH and natural concepts. Does the language one hears and speaks affect the
types of concepts one forms? The simple answer for supporters of the LRH would be
“yes”. Labels are proposed to aid in concept formation by providing information about
the underlying/internal structure and more abstract, implicit characteristics of
objects/entities that one would not know by perceptual features alone (Gelman &
Markman, 1987; Hermann, Medin, & Waxman, 2012; Plunkett et al., 2008). In this role,
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language is acting not as a meddler, but as an augmenter to perception, reducing some of
the inherent “fuzziness” in natural categories (Bhatt et al., 1988; Wolff & Holmes, 2011).
For instance, a very young child may confuse a zebra as a horse because of the perceptual
similarities between the two animals. Providing distinctive labels for the two animals can
aid the child in categorizing the animals properly and, thereafter, forming an anchored
concept for zebras that is independent of their concept of horses (Johnson, Mervis, &
Boster, 1992). Along the same line of reasoning, providing the same label for
perceptually dissimilar objects, such as calling both a whale and a dog a mammal, point
out the similarities between the two perceptually distinct species (Plunkett et al., 2008).
Clearly then, language is implicated in concept formation even before the infant
can produce or has fully acquired language. What this suggests is that it is not only the
language one speaks that can affect conceptual understanding, but the language one hears
as well. Specifically, the language utilized by the primary caregiver(s) should have a
major impact on the child’s conceptual abilities. There have been discussions of the role
that caregivers’ language may play in concept formation, but as of yet, there has been
very little empirical research to directly test this relationship (Plunkett et al., 2008;
Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). One exception is the cultural consensus model discussed by
Johnson and colleagues (1992). The model predicts that some pieces of information are
more widely distributed throughout a culture and become representative of a cultural
truth for that society. Truth, in this model, is defined not by factual integrity, but on the
basis that the majority of the members within that culture believe it to be accurate
(Johnson et al., 1992).
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This model implies that the role of language is in spreading the truth about
category membership. For instance, taxonomically speaking, humans are categorized as
members of the ape family, along with chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, bonobos, and
gibbons. However, in some cultures, it might be considered inaccurate to categorize
humans as animals, let alone as apes. Thereby, for that group, the cultural consensus
model would suggest that humans are in a separate category from other apes and/or
animals. This cultural knowledge is passed on through language by older members of the
society, such as parents and/or primary caregivers. Differences arise between the
concepts of very young children and adults due to young children’s lack of experience
and exposure to cultural truths. Also, this model explains differences in conceptual
understanding between cultures with differing languages (Johnson et al., 1992).
The findings just reviewed lend support to the LRH in that language works as an
augmenter to perception and helps to explain discrepancies between cultures when they
arise. What remains unanswered, however, is what factors that make up human language
aide in the process of categorization and concept formation for early language learners?
Is it semantic knowledge regarding the meanings of words, grammatical competency, or
more practical aspects of linguistic competence that create this relationship between
language and concept formation? To date, there have been no studies directly
investigating the role that language in a more complex, broader sense plays in concept
formation, but there have been allusions to the role that semantic knowledge might play
in concept formation (Gelman & Coley, 1990).
Gelman and Coley (1990) propose that for members of a category that do not
possess an overabundance of perceptual commonalities with other category members
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(i.e., atypical members), semantic knowledge of category names supplement the lack of
perceptual information in order to accurately form concepts of categories that include
these atypical members. If given labels for the categories, very young children were
better able to categorize atypical members due to the fact that the semantic knowledge of
the meaning of the category label provided the supplemental information necessary for
accurate categorization and subsequent concept formation (Gelman & Coley, 1990).
These results provide evidence suggesting that semantic knowledge could be important
for natural concept formation, but other linguistic components could play a role as well,
therefore, necessitating direct testing of this question, using a broader definition of
language before conclusions can be drawn.
Concept formation “without” language? Though language may play a significant
role in concept formation for typically developing humans, there is evidence that
language is not a necessary, condition for concept formation. It may very well augment
concept formation, especially when perceptual features fail, but there is evidence to
suggest that it is not explicitly needed in order to form concepts, even at more abstract
levels (e.g., Bhatt et al., 1988; Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Goldin-Meadow, Gelman, &
Mylander, 2005; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988). Some of this evidence originates from
work with children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Gasteb et al., 2006; Soulieres,
Mottron, Giguere, & Larochelle, 2011), deaf children (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005;
Ozcaliskan, Goldin-Meadow, Gentner, & Mylander, 2009), and nonhuman animals
(Bhatt et al., 1988; Lazareva et al., 2004; Lazareva et al., 2010; Roberts & Mazmanian,
1988; Vonk et al., 2012; Vonk et al., 2013; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 2004).
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Cimpian and Erickson (2012) suggest that the capacity to think in categories is an
innate ability for humans. From birth, human infants are predisposed to think in “kinds” –
things in the world “go together” due to some inherent structure in nature. These authors
suggest that this ability to group things into categories is not explicitly dependent upon
linguistic input. In addition, the augmenting role of language can exist only if the child is
already working under the assumption that objects/entities can be banded together to
form categories. By this assertion, the authors are suggesting that it is not language that
augments concept formation, but concepts that aide in the understanding of language
(Cimpian & Erickson, 2012).
Even those who support the idea that language augments perception and concept
formation concede that without specific linguistic input, perceptual features play a major
role in concept formation in infants and very young children (Gelman & Coley, 1990;
Johnson et al., 1992; Plunkett et al., 2008). For instance, Johnson and colleagues (1992)
discuss the ethnobiological, or cross-cultural universal, model as the contrasting model
to the cultural consensus model. The cross-cultural universal model predicts that the
ways in which various people perceive the regularities in the natural world is similar
across cultures and language barriers, resulting in universal trends in categorizing natural
entities. These universals emerge due to the fact that humans exist in the same world and
share many of the same perceptual experiences, despite being a part of differing cultures
and speaking different languages.
The cross-cultural universal model bases its prediction regarding universals on the
fact that we categorize entities based on morphological, highly salient, perceptual
features, not specifics based on the structures of various languages. While Johnson and
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colleagues (1992) found support for the cultural consensus model in their experiments,
they admit the undeniable importance of perceptual features in concept formation when
linguistic cues are not present (Johnson et al., 1992). Similarly, Gelman and Coley (1990)
state that children can and do use perceptual information to determine category
membership in the absence of language, even when the perceptual features are
misleading or confusing, therefore, leaving open the possibility of concept formation
without language.
Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. However, for typically developing
human children, it is nearly impossible to extricate the potential impact of language on
concept formation because they are immersed in it from birth. There are human
populations, though, that lend themselves to studying concept formation without
language. One such population is lower functioning children with ASD, due largely to the
fact that ASD is characterized by social, behavioral, and linguistic deficits/abnormalities
as compared to typically developing children (subsequently referred to as typicals).
Relevant to their abilities to form concepts is the suggestion that children with ASD may
show significant differences in cognitive processing and executive functioning as
compared to typicals. For instance, they may show general problems with data reduction
from infancy, but a heightened sensitivity to detail and feature detection, which, when
coupled together, makes grouping things together into categories, and hence forming
concepts, more difficult (Gasteb et al., 2006; Soulieres et al., 2011). In addition, lower
functioning children’s more severe language deficits could prevent them from using
labels as cues to supplement perceptual features (Gasteb et al., 2006).
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Despite the differences found between typicals and children with ASD regarding
executive functioning and language, children with ASD do form concepts for natural
objects in their environments. Even with linguistic deficits, children with ASD group
objects together into categories and form mental representations for those categories. Are
those concepts the same as those formed by typicals? The answer to that question, at this
point, is “maybe.” Gasteb and colleagues (2006) have demonstrated that children with
ASD do, indeed, form concepts despite their language deficits, though at a slower pace
than typicals (Gasteb et al., 2006). In explanation of Gasteb and colleagues’ (2006)
findings, Soulieres and colleagues (2011) suggest that this slower categorization seen in
children with ASD may be due - not to deficits in categorization ability- but to
differences in the strategies they use to form concepts. They found that children with
ASD tended to need longer exposure to the exemplars before their categorization began
to resemble that of typicals. Typicals began to extract rules for categorizing the
exemplars quickly; for example, all entities with oval head shapes, spotted back patterns,
and yellow coloration go together, despite having different tails and body shapes.
Children with ASD, however, required significantly more exposure to the
exemplars before any strategy seemed to emerge that resembled the rule-based strategies
of the typicals. The authors suggest that for children with ASD, using this experiencebased, rule-based, top-down strategy may take time and initially play a lesser role to
simply guessing. Again, however, the children with ASD were forming concepts, despite
their linguistic deficits, albeit more slowly and using different strategies than typicals
(Soulieres et al., 2011). These findings allude to the possibility that language may play a
lesser role in concept formation relative to other cognitive skills, such as executive
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functioning and relational skills. While language may act as an augmenter to concept
formation when present and intact, it is not a necessary tool in that process.
Children born deaf with no linguistic input. Children born deaf can also shed light
on the role of language in concept formation. Whereas many deaf children grow up in
environments where linguistic input is present in the form of American Sign Language
(or the prevailing gestural system of their culture) from very early on in their lives, there
are others who are not exposed to language in any meaningful form throughout their
development. This population is perhaps the best analog for studying concept formation
without language outside of utilizing nonhumans. Deaf children create gestures to
communicate information about generic, global kinds, such as birds fly, which emphasize
stable, enduring characteristics of category members that are readily perceived by the
senses. Even without linguistic input, these children are able to form concepts for
entities/objects in their environments in order to create a way in which to communicate
this information, emphasizing the role of perceptual features for concept formation
(Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; Ozcaliskan et al., 2009). This finding also lends support to
the notion that concepts actually help structure language instead of the reverse (Cimpian
& Erickson, 2012).
Nonhuman animals. In order to study the effects of no linguistic input on the
ability to form concepts, nonhuman animals are frequently utilized as models.
Comparative work has been done to determine what types of concepts animals are able to
form in the absence of human-like language. Premack (1983) asserted that only languagetrained apes and humans were capable of using more than perceptual similarity to form
concepts of more abstract categories that do not rely on concrete, image based
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representations. This proposition suggests that non-language trained animals should have
relatively little difficulty forming concrete, subordinate level concepts (e.g., members of
the same species), but more difficulty as the concepts increase in abstraction to basic and
superordinate level concepts. However, research has shown that animals of varying
species can form concepts at more than the concrete level, some at multiple levels at
once, suggesting that this ability to utilize more abstract concepts is not specifically
dependent upon language (Bhatt et al., 1988; Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998; Lazareva et al.,
2004; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988; Vonk et al., 2012; 2013; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002,
2004).
Some of the seminal work on concept formation at varying levels of abstraction in
animals was done with pigeons. Bhatt and colleagues (1988) found that despite the fuzzy
boundaries of natural categories, pigeons were capable of forming basic level concepts
(specifically - cats, people, flowers, cars, and chairs). These categories, however, were
perceptually dissimilar between categories and similar within categories, thereby,
possibly making the formation of the concepts easier. Lazareva and colleagues (2004,
2010) extracted two global, abstract level categories from the basic level categories used
by Bhatt et al. (1988) to test pigeons’ abilities to form more abstract concepts. The two
superordinate level categories they formed were natural (flowers plus people) and
artificial (cars plus chairs). They found that pigeons could not only form basic level
concepts, but they were also capable of forming more superordinate level concepts that
rely less on perceptual similarity and more on deeper, conceptual knowledge about the
members. These findings also demonstrate that pigeons, like humans, can simultaneously
and flexibly categorize the same stimuli at multiple levels of abstraction, though it is
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possible that they simply learned to treat the two categories (e.g., flowers and people)
similarly while lacking an overarching category that encapsulates them (Lazareva et al.,
2004; Lazareva et al., 2010). Taken together, the work with pigeons indicates that
concept formation is not exclusively dependent upon language and emerged farther back
in evolutionary history than previously believed.
Nonhuman primates have also been widely researched due to their close genetic
relationship to humans and the benefit to understanding the phylogenetic roots of concept
formation. Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) tested whether or not squirrel monkeys,
humans, and pigeons could form concepts at varying levels of abstraction. At the most
concrete level, which corresponds to the subordinate level of abstraction, the animals
were tested for their ability to form concepts for one species of bird (kingfishers) that
excluded other species of birds. If the animals were able to form concepts at only this
level, Premack’s (1983) hypothesis would be supported in that they are not capable of
abstract conceptual understanding. The intermediate level, which corresponds to the basic
level, discrimination required the animals to form a concept of birds that excluded other
animals. At the most abstract level, which corresponds to the superordinate level, the
animals were tested for their ability to form a concept for animals that excluded
nonanimals (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988).
Pigeons were found to learn concepts at the concrete level discrimination more
rapidly as compared to the other levels, which supported Premack’s (1983) hypothesis.
However, the monkeys were able to form concepts at both the concrete and abstract level
of abstraction, with the slowest acquisition to the intermediate level in both nonhuman
animal species (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988). Similar results have been found in non-

34
language trained rhesus macaques (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998) and a juvenile gorilla
(Vonk & MacDonald, 2002). More recent work with orangutans (Vonk & MacDonald,
2004) and chimpanzees (Vonk et al., 2013) have also shown similar patterns of results,
demonstrating that the basic level is salient in their conceptual understanding. Outside of
the primate order, recent work by Vonk and colleagues (2012) has demonstrated that
American black bears are capable of forming concepts at varying levels of abstraction.
While these animals’ concept formation capabilities may differ in the way in which they
are formed or the amount of exposure needed to form concepts, they, like non-typically
developing children, form concepts at multiple levels of abstraction. The aforementioned
results from children with ASD, children who were born deaf and were not exposed to
ASL, pigeons, nonhuman primates, and black bears demonstrate that these populations
are capable of abstract thought and concept formation, despite their linguistic deficits
and/or lack of linguistic input.
Summary of Natural Concepts
Forming concepts for naturally occurring stimuli is a daunting task due to the
inherently ill-defined structure of natural categories (Bhatt et al., 1988) where features
overlap between categories, some members are atypical members of the category that do
not share many features with other members, etc. This task has been suggested to be
impacted by the language one speaks and hears. Language may act as an augmenter,
highlighting commonalities and regularities in the environment that might not be readily
perceivable by the senses (e.g., Plunkett et al., 2008). Findings showing conceptual
abilities in populations that lack linguistic input (e.g., children with ASD, deaf children,
and nonhuman animals) demonstrate, however, that language is not a necessary
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component to concept formation (e.g., Gasteb et al., 2006; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005;
Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988).
When present, though, language does appear to play a role in shaping concepts.
Being that language is more than simply knowing the labels for objects and entities in the
environment, is there more to the relationship between language and concept formation
than what traditional measures of language ability provide? Another relevant question is
what role does language play in forming concepts that are based on psychological, in
contrast to biological, categories? Particularly, what role does language play in the
formation of concepts for human emotions?
Emotion Recognition
Humans are by nature social animals; social living brings about challenges that
are unique to living in groups. Some of those challenges include interacting with
conspecifics, forming and maintaining social bonds, maintaining social order, escaping
danger, confronting threats, and dealing with losses (Abe & Izard, 1999). Overcoming
those challenges is done partially through the ability to interpret the emotions of
conspecifics and reacting accordingly. But, how does one “read” the internal state of
another? Some suggest that we have developed an outward, emotion signaling system
using facial expressions that allows for quick interpretation of the emotion of a
conspecific without the influence of language (Abe & Izard, 1999; Ekman, 1969, 1970;
Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1994). Whereas, others suggest that the language we
speak determines/shapes the way in which we interpret facial expressions, essentially
stating that language creates the emotional reality in which we live (Lindquist et al.,
2006; Russell & Bullock, 1985).

36
Emotion Recognition “Without” Language – Role of Facial Expressions
When a layperson is approached regarding how they know how someone is
feeling (i.e.,interpreting the internal, emotional state of a conspecific), perhaps the most
popular response is that they use facial expressions to determine which emotion the
person is feeling from moment to moment. This commonly held belief that facial
expressions are a reliable means by which to judge the internal state of another human
was not widely accepted in the scientific community prior to the 1960s. Researchers, at
the time, believed that the face was actually a meager source of relevant information for
emotion recognition, and what information was provided was inaccurate and specific to
the culture in which one lived. These beliefs directly contradicted long-held folk beliefs
and evidence of the salience of faces to humans even in early infancy (Carroll & Russell,
1996; Ekman, 1993).
Following the hypotheses originally proposed by Darwin, two researchers, Paul
Ekman and Carroll Izard, separately pioneered the empirical study of the cultural
universality and innateness of facial expressions by comparing facial expressions and the
interpretation thereof between and among cultures around the world. What these
researchers and their colleagues found was that there was tremendous overlap in the types
of facial expressions produced and the interpretations of these expressions among the
cultures studied (e.g., Ekman, 1969, 1970; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1994). Their
findings led to the proposal of an emotion signaling system and the innatenessuniversality hypothesis (IUH), both of which are underpinned by the assertion that facial
expressions provide rich information that one can utilize in social situations to interpret

37
the emotional state of a conspecific and react accordingly (Ekman, 1993; Izard, 1994;
Widen & Russell, 2010).
Emotion signaling system. The theory of an emotion signaling system predicts that
certain patterns of facial movements, or facial expressions, have been selected for in our
species’ evolution as outward, visible signals for specific emotions. This association
between facial expressions and emotions is not arbitrary, but selected for through natural
selection (Ekman, 1999; Widen & Russell, 2010). Having unique facial expressions as
signals for emotions suggests that there are discrete psychological states occurring in an
individual and that both the individual experiencing the emotion and those observing the
individual possess a set of mental categories/concepts by which they can readily interpret
each of those discrete states using the signals provided (Abe & Izard, 1999). The emotion
signaling system is hypothesized to be in place and fully functioning before one year of
age (innate) and biologically-based, suggesting that there is a unique evolutionary
advantage for survival in group settings for producing easily interpretable, distinctive
facial expressions for specific emotions (Izard, 1994; Widen & Russell, 2010).
According to this view, expressions serve as “a functional communication system
that preceded language in evolution and precedes language in ontogeny” (Izard, 1994, p.
290). It is inherently adaptive and necessary to life in a social group to have differential,
universally recognized emotion signals. These signals should be representative of specific
emotions and not just based on valence (i.e., positive or negative). For instance, consider
an adult playing outdoors with a toddler. In one situation, the adult comes across a dead
animal in the grass by their feet and reacts with an expression of sadness or disgust. In
another situation, the adult comes across a poisonous snake in the grass near his foot and
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reacts with an expression of fear. If the emotion signaling system was not innate and was
based only on valence, the toddler would not gain much information from the
expressions. Conversely, if toddlers had an innate capacity to interpret each expression as
representing a distinct emotion, they could gain much more information that is vital to
their survival (Izard, 1994). An inability to recognize and discriminate between signals
provided by conspecifics is a significant disadvantage to survival in social groups (Widen
& Russell, 2010).
The innateness-universality hypothesis (IUH). The IUH arose out of the evidence
for the emotion signaling system. As is stated in its name, the IUH predicts that emotion
recognition based on facial expressions is both innate and universal. There are six “basic”
emotions that have been identified: anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and disgust.
These “basic” emotions have gained the most support for being innate and universally
expressed by specific facial configurations (Ekman, 1993; Waller et al., 2008). From
birth, human infants show a particular interest in and preferentially attend to the face.
Throughout development, faces have been shown to provide substantial information that
helps to organize and bring coherence to perceptual information (Quinn & Eimas, 1996).
Infants as young as three months old have been shown to be able to discriminate positive
from negative facial expressions, and by four to six months, have demonstrated the
ability to distinguish between at least some of the basic emotions (fear, anger, and
surprise).
By six to seven months, infants have been shown to be able to discriminate
among all the negative (fear, sadness, anger, and disgust) emotions based on facial
expressions (Izard, 1994). By the end of the first year of life, infants are able to use their
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experience with facial expressions to direct their behaviors when interacting with a social
partner through the use of social referencing (Widen & Russell, 2010). Early and
relatively sophisticated understanding of the basic emotions is proposed to be solely
based on biological cues, the most impactful of which are facial expressions (Wellman,
Harris, Banerjee, & Sinclair, 1995), creating what is known as the Face Superiority Effect
- more accurate categorization of emotions depicted when facial expressions are available
(Russell & Widen, 2002). This evidence provides support for the innateness of the use
and interpretation of facial expressions in emotion recognition. In addition, this early
ability to utilize and interpret emotion information facilitates infant-caregiver attachment,
social referencing, and the development of empathy and theory of mind (Russell &
Widen, 2002).
As for the universality component of the IUH, evidence of the presence and utility
of expressions for the basic emotions has been demonstrated in both literate and preliterate cultures around the world. This evidence suggests that these expressions are
culturally universal in nature, regardless of the language spoken in the cultures (e.g.,
Ekman, 1969, 1970, 1999). Across twenty-one literate cultures, there was strong
agreement about the emotions portrayed by specific posed facial expressions. Members
of pre-literate cultures chose the same facial expression to match an emotion-eliciting
story that was chosen by members of literate cultures. Also, when judging and producing
spontaneous facial expressions, there were no major differences between the cultures
studied (Ekman, 1999).
However, some minor differences between and among cultures were found.
According to the differential emotions theory, each distinct basic emotion varies along
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dimensions of intensity, from understated to extremely intense, causing slight variations
in facial expressions, but still containing similar underlying morphological features (e.g.,
smiles for happiness and frowns for sadness) (Abe & Izard, 1999; Izard, 1994).
Differences in the expression of certain emotions in some cultures arise from variations
in what have been termed as “display rules.” Display rules are culturally-specific rules
regarding who and to whom one can show certain emotions and when it is
proper/appropriate to display certain emotions. The differences between cultures that
have been found emanate from these display rules and not from differences in the ability
to produce the facial expressions or interpret the messages given by these signals across
cultures (Ekman, 1993, 1999).
Taken together, the aforementioned information provides a solid argument for the
existence of an emotion signaling system and support for the IUH. These findings suggest
that emotion recognition is not dependent upon language and is possible in the total
absence of language. This argument is supported by evidence demonstrating similar
facial configurations between humans and other primate species, including apes and Old
and New World monkeys (Ekman, 1999). However, there are those who assert that
without language as a guide, wading through something as murky as emotion recognition
in humans is nearly impossible (e.g., Lindquist et al., 2006). The controversy regarding
the amount of information that can be gained from using nonverbal signaling systems to
judge emotional states in others is partially due to the fact that some primates, including
humans, have evolved the capacity to voluntarily control the facial expressions they
produce in any given situation. This voluntary control allows for the extraction of
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misleading information from the facial expressions or outright deception on the part of
the expresser (Izard, 1994).
Russell (as cited in Izard, 1994) stated that there were two main issues raised by
this capability that caused issues for the existence of the emotion signaling system, and
therefore, the IUH, and its tenants regarding the use of facial information to judge
emotions in others: 1) is there enough regularity in the link between a facial expression
and its underlying emotional state to categorize the expression as representing that
underlying state and 2) can the link between feelings and expressions be modified by the
voluntary control of facial expression to the extent to which the link becomes
nonexistent? Izard’s (1994) response to these questions is related to the fact that it would
be maladaptive to possess such a large communication system of very obvious, selfrevealing signals without the capacity to voluntarily control them when necessary. For
example, when confronted with an enemy who both outnumbers and has more weaponry
than you, it would be maladaptive to respond with an expression of fear. It would be
more adaptive to be able to mislead or deceive one’s enemy by displaying confidence or
enjoyment, despite your true internal state. This ability to self-regulate facial expressions
may be a recent adaptation in the phylogeny of the species, not evidence against the
system or the IUH, and might be a result of the highly complex social lives of humans
and some other modern primates (Izard, 1994).
Despite the evidence provided above, however, there are still many critics who
challenge the IUH and the reliance upon facial expressions (and other nonverbal signals)
to classify emotions. The IUH suggests that by emotion recognition being an innate
capacity, acquisition of the underlying emotion concepts is fast and not drastically altered
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by the development of other cognitive skills, such as language, due to the fact that the
basic concepts are already in place at birth. In fact, the absence of a label for an emotion
does not inherently indicate that a child or culture does not express/feel that emotion.
Because each basic emotion varies in intensity there are a vast amount of possible terms
that could be used to describe each variation, so the lack of a term for a specific intensity
of an emotion does not mean that it is not felt or expressed by a facial expression, just
that there is no word for it in that culture (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1994). As a note, there is
even some evidence of early, relatively sophisticated emotion term comprehension and
use by very young children that lends credence to the innateness of emotion recognition.
Ridgeway, Waters, and Kuczaj II (1985) found that infants/toddlers were reliably using
many of the basic emotion terms before the age of two years. This finding has been
supported by evidence suggesting that by the age of two, children are referring to a wide
range of emotions that are expressed by both others and themselves (Dunn, Bretherton, &
Munn, 1987).
However, there are those who argue that the conceptual system that is in place at
birth, if it exists, is inherently not the same as the conceptual system possessed by adults
(Widen & Russell, 2008). This gradual emergence of emotion concepts argument has
gained popularity among supporters of the LRH (e.g., Lindquist et al., 2006) and suggests
that experience with the emotion labels in one’s language shapes, and possibly,
effectively determines the ways in which we, particularly infants and early language
learners, view the affective world (Lindquist et al., 2006; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008,
2010).
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Emotion Recognition “With” Language – LRH and the Circumplex Model
Advocates of the LRH suggest that the influence of language extends beyond
concepts for observable, perceptual categories to help in the formation of concepts for
unobservable phenomena (e.g., emotional states) (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Lindquist
et al., 2006; Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Because emotions are internal, psychological states,
language allows for clarification when misinterpretations of outward cues occur and for
reflection on past and/or future events in order to behave appropriately in the present
(Dunn et al., 1987). As was its role in natural concept formation, language may act as an
augmenter, providing the extra conceptual tools necessary to form concepts for internal,
unobservable states (Wolff & Holmes, 2011).
Language has been suggested to play a role in differentiating between the varying
emotions above and beyond what facial expressions are capable of alone. According to
Carroll and Russell (1996), facial expressions show “limited situational dominance,”
indicating that expressions are merely “quasi-physical” information that “indicate its
simplest literal meaning,” (like a smile, cry, or yawn) which by themselves do not
provide adequate information to judge the underlying psychological state (p. 206). It is
then up to the language spoken by the culture to determine what emotional state(s) those
facial expressions represent; in essence language creates the affective reality in which one
exists (Lindquist et al., 2006). Therefore, it would follow that very young children and
preverbal infants may not possess the same conceptual representations for emotions, as
adults who have had more exposure to their native language. The LRH supports a more
gradual emergence and development of emotion concepts than does the IUH. This
assertion that emotion concepts are developed in incremental steps and continue to
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differentiate longer into development than previously believed spurred Russell and
colleagues to develop a model for how emotion concepts change through development
and eventually become like those seen in adults. This model is termed the Circumplex
Model of Emotions (Russell & Bullock, 1985).
Circumplex model of emotions. The fundamental premise of the Circumplex
model is that emotion categories based on different facial expressions fall into two
bipolar dimensions based on valence (pleasure-displeasure) and vary in degree of arousal.
Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of the Circumplex model from Russell and
Bullock (1985, p. 1291). The model gets its name based on the circular pattern that
emerges when each expression is positioned in the model based on where it falls along
the dimensions of valence and arousal.

Figure 1. Circumplex model of emotions as depicted in Figure 1 from Russell and
Bullock (1985, p. 1291).
The main prediction that is derived from the Circumplex model is that the
emotion concepts possessed by infants and very young children are fundamentally
different from those of adults. The model predicts that emotion concepts emerge
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gradually and continue to be shaped as the child develops. Research on the model has
demonstrated that the emotion categories used by very young children are broader than
those of adults. Concepts for emotions are initially based on the dimensions of pleasure
and displeasure (positive-negative) and are differentiated gradually through learning the
various labels for each specific emotion (Carroll & Russell, 1996; Russell & Bullock,
1985; Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008, 2010). It is of importance
to note that this research has focused on the six basic emotions with happiness and
surprise making up the positive facial expressions/emotions and anger, sadness, fear, and
disgust constituting the negative facial expressions/emotions. Children do not actually
possess the conceptual underpinnings to differentiate between the emotions until they
have acquired the label for the specific emotion (Widen & Russell, 2010).
These results suggest that language is an integral part of differentiating the
various emotions. In fact, Russell and Widen (2002) demonstrated a Label Superiority
Effect (in contrast to the Face Superiority Effect discussed previously) in very young
children when categorizing basic emotions. When given the labels for specific emotions,
the children were significantly more accurate in categorizing facial expressions than
when given only facial expressions by which to match the images. In the condition where
facial expressions only were provided to help categorize emotions, children’s
categorization of the facial expressions fell in line with the dimensions of pleasuredispleasure. In this experiment, the labels are working in a similar manner as labels for
natural objects by differentiating between entities that are in the same category and,
therefore, share more perceptual similarity (Russell & Widen, 2002). For example, Figure
2 (from Russell & Widen, 2002, p. 38) graphically depicts the pattern of differentiation
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with age in the children’s concept for the negative emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and
disgust).

Figure 2. Proportion of each type of facial expression categorized as angry by age in
years from Russell and Widen (2002, Figure 3, p. 38).
As shown, at two-years-old, the negative emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and
disgust) are not yet differentiated from each other, with the majority of children
categorizing all negative facial expressions as anger. By four, sadness begins to become
differentiated from fear, but full differentiation of the concepts does not occur until later
in childhood (around seven) and continues even during that time, especially for fear and
disgust (Russell & Widen, 2002). Russell and his colleagues found that these concepts
narrow in a very similar manner that follows the acquisition and production of specific
emotion labels. As the child learns the emotion labels of their native language, the
concepts they form for specific emotions (based on facial expressions) become narrower
until they begin to resemble the concepts of adults. They referred to this as a
differentiation model of emotions based on the Circumplex model (Russell & Widen,
2002; Widen & Russell, 2008, 2010).
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Circumplex model as a differentiation model. Children’s concepts for emotions
begin in two very broad categories (positive and negative), encompassing all emotions in
those two categories and not differentiating between the specific emotions as adults do.
For instance, all negative facial expressions (anger, sadness, fear, and disgust) are
categorized together; therefore, these categorization “errors” made by very young
children simply reflect that the concepts they possess are not yet differentiated as are
those of adults. Differentiation within the broad categories occurs as labels for emotions
are learned (Widen & Russell, 2010). Tests of the Circumplex model have shown that the
number of different emotion labels used to label facial expressions increases with age and
that some expressions are labeled earlier than others (Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen &
Russell, 2003, 2008).
Russell and Widen (2002) and Widen and Russell (2003) demonstrated that the
labels for each emotion emerge in a systematic manner. If the child produces one emotion
label, it is happy. If the child produces two emotion labels, they tend to be happy and
angry (and in some cases, happy and sad). If the child utilizes three labels, they are
usually happy, sad, and angry. The fourth and fifth labels used are typically either scared
(fear) or surprise. The final of the basic emotion labels to emerge is disgust. Figure 3
shows the pattern of emergence of emotion labels by age that has been supported by
Russell and colleagues (e.g., Russell, & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003).
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Figure 3. A graph depicting the systematic emergence of emotion terms by age (Widen &
Russell, 2008, Figure 2, p.294).
The main crux of these findings is that when children perceive facial expressions,
they interpret them in a different manner than do adults based on the differing conceptual
structures they possess for emotion concepts. Their “errors’ in categorization are rooted
in the dimensions of pleasure and displeasure upon which their concepts are based. As it
is for natural concepts, it is much harder to differentiate between facial expressions
depicting expressions from the same broad category (e.g., anger and fear). Until the child
has ample experience with the labels for each emotion and the contexts during which they
occur, the concepts they form will remain broad and undifferentiated (Russell & Widen,
2002; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008, 2010).
Language complexity and emotion recognition. The question still remains whether
the effects of language on emotion concept formation are as simple as learning specific
labels for specific emotions. Does possession of this extra conceptual tool aid in the
ability to form specific concepts for each discrete emotion based on the outward cues
provided by facial expressions? Or, is there is more to language’s role in guiding emotion
recognition based on facial expressions? There is a significant amount of literature that
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deals with the relationship between language and the development of social concepts
such as emotional understanding and theory of mind (Astington & Jenkins, 1999;
Cheung, 2010; de Rosnay et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2000). A consistent positive
relationship between the child’s linguistic ability and performance on tasks relating to
these abilities suggests that the LRH proponents are correct in their belief that language is
related to how people perceive and interact with the world around them.
But what aspects of language are related to these effects? Is it knowledge of the
meanings of words (semantics) and sheer size of the child’s vocabulary that lead to the
results shown, or is it grammatical competency and the types of words used/how words
are used that aides in the formation of social/emotion concepts? There is some evidence
that both syntactic ability (knowledge of the grammatical rules of language) and
semantics play a role in false belief understanding (Cheung, 2010). However, there is no
evidence at this point looking at the complexity of language and how it relates to emotion
recognition based on facial expressions. The research of Russell and colleagues seems to
indirectly indicate that semantic knowledge of word meanings is of importance in
developing emotion concepts for facial expressions (Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen &
Russell, 2003, 2008, 2010). More research is needed to help fill in the gaps in our
understanding of language’s role in emotion recognition based on facial expressions and
to help elucidate the relationship between innate capacity and experience with language.
The Current Project
Specific Goals
The specific goal of the current project was to elucidate the relationship between
language complexity and natural and emotion concept formation in early language
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learners (two-, three-, four-, and five-year-olds). Language complexity provides a
broader, more encompassing means of assessing language competency by measuring
more than the child’s semantic (word meanings) competency, which is the major focus of
most of the traditional language measures. Specifically, the test utilized (a selection of
assessments taken from the Brigance Diagnostic Inventory of Early Childhood
Development II henceforth referred to as the IED-II – Brigance, 2004) measured not only
receptive and expressive vocabulary, but also quantitative term comprehension, select
aspects of grammatical competency, and more practical/applied linguistic competency.
The inclusion of these components allows for a better understanding of the role of
language in concept formation.
The IED-II was designed as a broad-spectrum developmental inventory for
children from birth to age six years. It is highly utilized in educational settings as it is
criterion-referenced, does not require specialized training to administer, and allows for a
comprehensive understanding of whether or not the child is developing in a manner that
is typical for his or her age (Brigance, 2004). The 2004 edition was also norm-referenced
and validated to be used as a standardized measure (Glascoe, 2004). The IED-II contains
eleven sections: a) perambulatory motor skills and behaviors, b) gross-motor skills and
behaviors, c) fine-motor skills and behaviors, d) self-help skills, e) speech and language
skills, f) general knowledge and comprehension, g) social and emotional development, h)
readiness, i) basic reading skills, j) manuscript writing, and k) basic math (Brigance,
2004). The basic productive and receptive vocabulary tasks for this study were taken
from the Speech and Language Skills, and all other tasks were taken from the General
Knowledge and Comprehension section.
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For the purpose of this study, the language complexity was comprised of the
child’s composite productive and receptive vocabulary scores in addition to their
comprehension of quantitative terms. In addition, measures of grammatical competency
were included and were the child’s knowledge and use of plurals (-s and –ing),
prepositions, and irregular plural nouns. In order to measure the child’s more
practical/applied linguistic competency, their knowledge of class inclusions (e.g., foods,
things you can read, toys), what to do in a given situation, and practical uses of objects
were assessed (Brigance, 2004).
The categories utilized in the natural concept discrimination tasks were based on
the levels of abstraction described by Rosch and colleagues (1976; subordinate, basic,
and superordinate). These tasks have been utilized in comparative work with
chimpanzees and bears by Vonk and colleagues (2012, 2013) and were adapted from the
tasks utilized by Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) in pigeon, squirrel monkeys, and adult
humans. They consisted of two-alternative-forced choice (2AFC) tasks, with two images
representing two different concepts at the same level of abstraction (e.g., basic) presented
simultaneously on a computer touch-screen. The participant was required to choose one
of the two images that represent the category member that was correct for that session.
These natural concept tasks used images from the following categories, which
increased in inclusiveness as the levels increase: tigers versus lions (subordinate), cats
versus dogs (basic), and animals versus nonanimals (superordinate). These particular
categories were chosen for two reasons. First, early language learners are likely to have
more experience with, and greater interest in animals; therefore, these stimuli are likely to
be salient for even the youngest of participants. Secondly, I chose to maintain a concept
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structure as described by Markman and Wisniewskie (1997), where all lower level
categories originate from the same parent superordinate level category, which increased
the between category similarity, but allowed for enough variability to allow for choosing
categories that have very salient perceptual differences (e.g., tigers have stripes and lions
do not) at the lower levels.
The manipulation of levels of abstraction helped clarify the effects of language at
the varying levels. At the subordinate level in the current tasks, linguistic cues may not be
as necessary even for the youngest of participants due to the salient perceptual
differences. In contrast, there may be a more pronounced need for language at the
superordinate level in order to highlight the commonalities among the wider ranges of
members within the categories. In addition, it is of importance to note that each of the
higher levels incorporated images of members seen in the lower levels. For instance, the
“cat” category contained both lion and tiger images, therefore, requiring the child to
make the conceptual connection between the animals that they could have previously had
to discriminate between in order to perform the lower level task.
The task for discriminating emotion concepts was the same as that used for the
natural concepts. However, instead of images of animals, images of facial expressions
were used. Five emotion/non-emotions, which included four of the six basic emotions
discussed previously (anger, sadness, happiness, and positive surprise plus neutral faces),
were used. In order to make the tasks as analogous as possible, the emotion concepts
were presented within three levels of abstraction as well. These levels were primarily
based on Russell and Bullock’s (1985) Circumplex model. As before, the lower levels
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originated from the same parent superordinate level category and increase in
inclusiveness as the levels increase.
The three levels of abstraction were as follows: anger versus sadness
(subordinate), positive versus negative (basic), and emotion versus non-emotion
(superordinate). The basic level categories were chosen based on the findings that very
young children initially partition emotion concepts based on facial expressions into these
two broad, more inclusive categories until they are later differentiated as the child learns
specific labels for each discrete emotion/facial expression (Carroll & Russell, 1996;
Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2010). The positive category included facial
expressions for happiness and positive surprise, while the negative category included
facial expressions for anger and sadness. These emotions are considered basic emotions
that have distinct facial expressions (for review, see Ekman, 1994; Keltner & Ekman,
2000).
The superordinate level of the emotion categories, emotion versus non-emotion,
was the most inclusive of the categories. Both positive and negative emotions were
combined to create the emotion category, while neutral faces comprised the non-emotion
category. This study is the first to permit analysis of emotion concepts at varying levels
of abstraction. The structure of these categories allowed for more direct testing of the
Circumplex model by testing its central premise of the initial breadth of emotion
categories in early language learners (Russell & Bullock, 1985).
It is of importance to mention that the images were not put through rigorous
testing to ensure the expressions match precisely to the morphological configurations that
have been found for each of the different emotion expressions. I relied on the judgments
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of laypeople (college undergraduates) to determine if the images of facial expressions I
chose to depict the emotions reliably signaled the emotions intended. This aspect is
important because the majority of previous studies utilized images that were tested to
ensure that the facial configurations were precise, prototypical, posed depictions of the
intended emotions (e.g., Russell & Bullock, 1985; Widen & Russell, 2008). This study,
however, could have increased external validity due to the fact that the facial expressions
we encounter in daily life are not prototypical. They are not posed or produced by a
computer program, but are often spontaneous, and can be both valid signaling cues,
indicating the true emotions of the expresser, and deliberately misleading cues. As
mentioned by Izard (1994), emotions vary significantly in the intensity in which they are
felt and expressed. It is important to attempt to utilize images of facial expressions that
represent the range of the realistic expression of emotions that occurs in everyday
encounters, instead of relying heavily on averaged depictions.
Hypotheses
The overarching prediction was that language complexity would predict
performance at all levels of abstraction in the natural and emotion concept
discriminations, but could have the greatest impact at the most abstract levels, which
depend more heavily on language and less on perceptual features. Specifically, it was
hypothesized that as language complexity increased, so too would performance on the
concept discrimination tasks, with this increase in performance being most pronounced
for more abstract level categories. This hypothesis is in line with the Linguistic Relativity
Hypothesis, which states that language impacts the way in which the speaker thinks and,
in turn, how concepts are formed (i.e., Lindquist et al., 2006; Plunkett et al., 2008; Wolff
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& Holmes, 2011; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). While I predicted no differences between ages
or genders, the variables were included in the model as they could influence the impact of
language on concept ability. Language should be the primary predictor of concept ability
and mediate effects of age and gender.
Test of the “language as an augmenter” hypothesis. Language can highlight
commonalities between category members that are not obvious by perception alone (e.g.,
warm-blooded) (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Along this vein, it could be predicted that
language could play an influential role in the discrimination of concepts that are more
abstract, in other words, that share fewer perceptual commonalities within and between
categories (e.g., animals versus nonanimals). Whereas, it could play a less important role
in the discrimination of more concrete concepts that contain more perceptual similarities
within and between categories, and are easily differentiated by salient perceptual cues,
such as coloration (e.g., lions versus tigers).
It is, in turn, predicted that the language complexity will have a greater impact on
the superordinate level natural and emotion concept discriminations than they will on the
subordinate level discriminations. It is the within category dissimilarity, rather than the
distinction between categories, that could necessitate language as an augmenter to help
highlight the commonalities between members that might not obviously be connected by
perception alone. For instance, determining the categorical relationship between an insect
and a mammal may be less obvious than determining the relationship between a lion and
a domesticated housecat. Given that the basic level categories (cats versus dogs) originate
from the same parent superordinate category, they share perceptual similarities between
categories. In addition, there is a greater degree of perceptual overlap between exemplars

56
within basic level categories. Therefore, performance in this task could be less affected
by language use.
Emotion concept discrimination predictions – Tests of the Circumplex model. If
the predictions of the Circumplex model (Russell & Bullock, 1985) hold true for this
sample, the children in all age groups should show similar patterns of responses and
errors when performing the tasks. Based on this model, it was expected that the best
performance should be on the basic level of abstraction, regardless of age – positive
versus negative facial expressions – due to the fact that young children parse different
emotions based on the dimensions of pleasure and displeasure, creating two broad,
inclusive concepts for positive emotions (happy and surprise) and negative emotions
(anger and sadness). It was also predicted that the most errors would be seen on the
subordinate level discriminations. Despite the fact that anger is one of the first emotions
to emerge as a distinct emotion, if fear has yet to be differentiated from other negative
emotions, confusions will still occur at this level of abstraction (Widen & Russell, 2008).
Performance on the superordinate level discrimination is predicted to be in between the
basic level and the subordinate level performance or indistinguishable from the basic
level due to the high degree of inclusiveness captured in this discrimination.
However, if emotion recognition is biologically based, innate, and an evolutionary
adaptation for survival as predicted by the IUH (Ekman, 1993, 1999; Izard, 1994), then
from early in development, faces are predicted to provide cues to the internal emotional
state of an individual. These basic emotions, including happiness, sadness, anger, and
surprise, are predicted to be differentiable from each other even in the youngest of
participants (Ekman, 1993, 1999; Izard, 1994). Therefore, children’s performance on the
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subordinate level (anger v. sadness) was predicted to be significantly above the level
expected by chance alone, regardless of age, due to the fact that the emotion concepts are
clearly distinguished from birth.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Participants
There were 74 total participants ranging in age from 2:0 to 5:6 years old. Five
two-year-olds (three males and two females ranging in age from 2:0 to 2:11), 39 threeyear-olds (16 males and 23 females from 3:0 to 3:11), 23 four-year-olds (11 males and 12
females from 4:0 to 4:11), and seven five-year-olds (two males and five females from 5:0
to 5:6) were recruited from daycares and private schools in Mobile, Alabama, Ocean
Springs, Mississippi, and the surrounding areas. Only children whose primary language is
English participated in the study. In addition, children with a diagnosis of any language
or cognitive impairments that could impact performance were not included in the study.
There were no other constraints or restrictions on participation. Conformity to these
selection criteria was determined through a short demographic survey given to the parents
with the consent package containing the informed consent information and permission
form.
Undergraduate Sample for Norming the Emotion Concept Images
One hundred and fifteen undergraduates with approximately 75% females and
25% males were recruited from the undergraduate psychology subject pool at The
University of Southern Mississippi. There were no specific selection requirements for the
undergraduates to participate beyond being over the age of eighteen. They received two
experimental credit points towards their course grade for their participation in the
norming of the emotion concept discrimination images.
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Apparatus, Materials, and Stimuli
Norming of Emotion Concept Discrimination Images
Prior to choosing the images for the emotion concept discriminations, it was
necessary to ensure the facial expressions in the images were rated by adults as
portraying the intended emotion. These images were uploaded to an online survey site,
Qualtrics.com. The participants were directed to the site from the SONA system. Prior to
beginning the task, they were required to electronically provide a signature on the
informed consent document. They were then directed to view each image, presented
individually, and determine which of seven emotions were being depicted by the images.
For each of the seven facial expressions (happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise,
amusement, and neutral), the participants were shown 152 total, 400 X 600 mp images
that were downloaded from Google Image search and cropped using Microsoft Office
Picture Manager to include only faces or faces and upper torso only. This number
included the number of images for each expression that were needed in the computer
tasks plus five extra images to account for any ambiguous (unknown) ratings. They were
asked to classify the images as portraying a happy, sad, fearful, surprised, amused, angry,
neutral, or unknown face. The ratings for each face were downloaded to an Excel
spreadsheet and analyzed to determine if the images portrayed the intended emotions
(70% of participants agreed upon emotion expressed). Experimental credit points to help
fulfill course experimental opportunity points were awarded for participation.
Concept Discrimination Tasks
The computer tasks were presented on a Panasonic Toughbook CF 18 Laptop
Computer. Experiments were programmed using RealBasic 2006 for Windows. Stimuli

60
for the natural concept formation discriminations consisted of two-dimensional
photographs that were similar to those used by Vonk and colleagues (2012, 2013) while
the stimuli for the emotion concept discriminations had not been used previously. For the
three natural concept discriminations, the images depicted the animals from a variety of
perspectives and orientations including close-ups, whole body, side views, head only, and
so on, to help control for the possibility that a single perceptual feature (such as tails)
could be utilized to distinguish between the stimuli. For the subordinate level
discrimination, there were twenty images of lions and twenty images of tigers. The basic
level discrimination consisted of twenty images of felines/cats that included novel images
of both lions and tigers in addition to a variety of other members of the Felidae family
versus twenty images of canines/dogs that could include wolves, foxes, domestic dogs
and other members of the Canidae family. The superordinate level discrimination
included twenty images of animals including felines and canines plus other taxonomic
groups such as primates, reptiles, birds, insects, etc., versus twenty images of nonanimals
that could include foods, dwellings, plants, statues, clothing, etc.
For the emotion concept discriminations, the images for the most subordinate
level discrimination consisted of twenty images of facial expressions of anger versus
sadness. For the basic level discrimination, the images were faces (some close-up faces
and some upper body shots including the face and the upper torso) depicting two positive
facial expressions (ten happy and ten positive surprise) versus twenty images depicting
two negative facial expressions (ten angry and ten sad). The superordinate level
discrimination included twenty images containing all four facial expressions from the
previous level of abstraction (five of each - happy, positive surprise, anger, and sadness)
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versus twenty images depicting neutral facial expressions (non-emotion). Although the
images depicted the same categories as used in other discriminations, novel images were
used for each discrimination. The images for both the basic and superordinate level
discriminations were cropped to show only the head region or the head and part of the
upper torso. The images were from slightly varying angles with some being the head
facing straight ahead and some with the head slightly turned, but both eyes still visible
and some being more close-up than others. All images, however, had to have the entire
face visible to be included. The categories increased in level of abstraction and degree of
inclusiveness from subordinate to superordinate with the subordinate having the lowest
level of both abstraction and inclusiveness and superordinate containing the highest level
of both abstraction and inclusiveness.
If the child made an incorrect choice, the computer produced an unpleasant
buzzing sound, and the experimenter told the child to try again. If the child made a
correct response, the computer produced a pleasant tone, and the experimenter told the
child that he or she did a good job. Additionally, after a correct choice a short amusing
video clip was played immediately after the pleasant tone. For the first five correct
choices, a video clip of a cat jumping out of a box was played. The next six correct
choices were reinforced with a clip of a kitten being tickled. And the next nine correct
responses were reinforced with video of a hamster doing back flips. Stickers were also
used as reinforcement for correct responses. Snack-size plastic zipper bags were used to
contain the child’s stickers during testing.
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Language Complexity
Selections from the IED-II (Brigance, 2004) were utilized to measure language
complexity (described in a previous section). The materials were kept in a two-inch
binder. The materials were simply the images printed on cardstock provided by the
authors of the measure, but some tasks required utilizing outside materials. In order to
assess the child’s knowledge of body parts, the child was asked to point to the part of
their body named by the experimenter or name parts of the experimenter’s body when
indicated. A PowerPoint presentation on the Panasonic ToughBook was utilized to
present images from the quantitative concepts section. These images included such
images as a full versus an empty glass/box, a small versus a large animal, a tall versus a
short building, a box with more versus less kittens, etc. Additionally, seven paper clips
and two pencils (one short and one long) were utilized in the quantitative concepts
section. Children received stickers as reinforcement sporadically throughout the task to
maintain motivation. The children received the stickers regardless of their performance
on the measures.
Procedure
In order for a child to participate, their parents must have returned the consent
form, which was distributed by the facility prior to beginning testing, to the experimenter.
The consent packet also included a short demographic survey containing the child’s
name, birthday, primary language spoken in the home, questions regarding any diagnosed
language or cognitive impairments, socioeconomic status of the family, and parents’ level
of education.
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After receiving the signed consent forms, the testing occurred at the child’s school
or daycare facility during regular school hours with testing occurring over an average of
two days with one to two testing sessions per week (depending upon the facility), per
child and with each testing session taking approximately thirty to forty-five minutes to
conduct. The child was removed from his or her regular classroom activities for testing
and taken to a room where the testing materials were set up. Before beginning any testing
the child was asked to give their assent to participate and had the purpose of the study
and the informed consent information explained to them in terms he or she could
understand. It was emphasized that they did not have to answer any questions if they did
not want to do so, could stop the testing at any point, and could take breaks if they needed
or wanted to do so.
Procedure for the Norming of the Emotion Concept Images
The images were uploaded onto a secure online survey site, providing the
participants the opportunity to participate from any location with Internet access. Before
being able to proceed to the images, the participants were required to give their electronic
consent to participate. They were given the opportunity to read and print the informed
consent document, which emphasized that they could stop participating at any point.
Each image was then presented one following the other on the page in the same serial
order for all participants, and a scale was provided for the participants to classify the
images as portraying a happy, sad, fearful, angry, surprised, amused, neutral, or unknown
facial expression. All basic and one derived emotion were included initially. Upon
completion of the experiment, the participants received experimental credit points to
contribute to their course experimental participation requirement.
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After the completion of testing, the responses were analyzed by the experimenter.
Only images that were rated as portraying the intended emotion by 70% of the
undergraduates were utilized in the emotion concept discriminations. Any images that did
not meet this criterion were not utilized as images in the tasks for the children. It was
found that fear was not distinguishable from other negative emotions, nor was
amusement clearly distinguishable from other positive emotions. These emotions were
then excluded from the categories for the children’s tasks; therefore, the facial
expressions utilized for the concept discrimination tasks were anger, sadness, happiness,
positive surprise, and neutral.
Experimental Design
The order in which the child received the concept tasks was randomized and
counterbalanced between subjects and within age groups to control for order effects. The
IED-II (Brigance, 2004) was administered on a separate testing day approximately one
week after completion of the concept tasks due to the late inclusion of this task to the
project. Each of the two-alternative, forced choice tasks contained twenty trials. The tasks
contained forty images total for each of the three discriminations: twenty correct stimuli
(S+) and twenty incorrect stimuli (S–). The order in which the participants received each
of the three levels of abstraction was counterbalanced across participants to control for
and investigate any possible order effects. There were six possible orders in which the
children could have received the discriminations (subordinate, basic, superordinate).
Within the subordinate level natural concept discrimination, approximately half of
the participants were assigned lions as the S+ with tigers as the S-, and half were assigned
tigers as the S+ with lions as the S-. For the basic level discrimination, all the participants

65
were reinforced for choosing felines/cats with canines/dogs as the S- as this category is
inclusive of the subordinate level categories (lions versus tigers). At the superordinate
level all the children were reinforced for choosing animals with nonanimals as the Sagain due to the fact that this category is the parent category of both the lower level
categories. The side location (left or right) of the S+ was counterbalanced within the
tasks. Images were randomly paired and presented on each trial with no images repeated
within or between tasks.
For the subordinate level emotion concept discrimination, approximately half
were reinforced for choosing facial expressions depicting anger with expressions
depicting sadness as the S-, and half were reinforced for choosing facial expressions
depicting sadness with expressions depicting anger as the S-. The basic level followed the
same pattern with all reinforced for choosing negative facial expressions with positive
facial expressions as the S- due to the fact that the subordinate level categories (anger and
sadness) are included within the negative emotions category. At the superordinate level,
all participants in each age group were reinforced for choosing facial expressions clearly
depicting different emotion states with faces that do not clearly depict an emotion (nonemotions) as the S-. The emotion category was also based on the structure of the two
lower level categories being derived from this parent category of emotions. The side
position of the correct matches (S+) were counterbalanced within each session of each
task, and images were randomly paired and presented on each trial with no images
repeated within or between tasks.
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Procedure for Natural and Emotion Concept Discriminations
The procedure was the same for both the natural and emotion concept
discrimination tasks. The child was removed from his or her regular classroom for the
duration of the testing session and brought to the testing room. Each child was tested
individually in a quiet room in order to eliminate as much distraction as possible. The
child was asked if he or she wanted to “play my games with me,” and if the answer was
affirmative, a brief discussion ensued regarding how to play the “games.” The child was
seated at a desk beside (or cattycorner to) the experimenter and in front of the computer.
All responses by the child were made by using a stylus on the touchscreen monitor. The
experimenter set up the session by choosing the appropriate S+ and S- as determined by
the trial configuration for that child’s participant number. This was done with the
computer screen facing away from the child as to not accidentally prime the child if he or
she could read.
Before starting the session, the experimenter explained the “game” by saying,
“We are going to play a picture game today.” Then the experimenter set up a
demonstration task, using categories that the child was not tested on (primates versus
non-primates). The experimenter then introduced “magic pencil” (the stylus) and told
them that they were supposed to use it to touch the screen and make their choices. Then,
she stated, as the demonstration images appeared, “You are going to see two pictures on
the computer screen. Your job is to pick the picture that makes the computer beep.” She
then chose the correct image and stated, “If you make the computer beep, a silly video
will play and you will get a sticker in your sticker bag.” She then stated, as she chose an
incorrect image, “But, if you make the computer buzz, you won’t get a sticker, but you
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can keep trying and try to get stickers next time.” Then the experimenter allowed the
child to try. She handed the child the stylus and asked them, “Which one do you think
will make the computer beep so we can see a silly video?” The child was allowed to
choose until they got one correct, and guidance was provided if necessary. The
experimenter then asked the child if he or she understood how to play and if so, began the
session. If not, the child was allowed to ask questions to clarify the instructions.
The child was then required to make an orienting response by touching a black
screen with the stylus to initiate the first trial. After they touched the screen, two images
appeared, and the child was to choose one of them using the stylus. If the child did not
immediately make a choice, the experimenter prompted he or she to pick the picture they
thought would make the computer beep with the “magic pencil.” The experimenter gave
the child no cues as to what was correct or incorrect. If the child asked the experimenter
any questions regarding which one was correct, the experimenter simply said, “Which
one do you think is right?” There was no time limit set in the computer program for them
to make a response. If after thirty seconds the child had made no attempt to respond, the
experimenter asked the child if he or she still wanted to play the game to make sure they
still wanted to participate.
If the image chosen by the child represented an image from the S+ category, the
computer emitted a pleasant tone, the amusing video clip played, and the experimenter
put a sticker in the child’s sticker bag and told them “Good job!” If the child made an
incorrect choice, the computer produced an unpleasant buzzing sound, the screen became
black and displayed the trial number and the word incorrect, and the experimenter said to
the child “Oops! That’s okay! Try again!” There was no correction procedures if the trial
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was incorrect; therefore, the next trial proceeded as usual until all twenty trials were
complete for that session. The next discriminations were then administered as determined
by random test orderings. The child was reminded of the task instructions prior to each
new discrimination task if deemed necessary from their performance and attention level.
The procedure for all discriminations was the same. The only prompt the
experimenter gave was reminding them to pick the picture that they think would make the
computer beep if they did not make a choice after approximately ten seconds between
trials. The experimenter responded to any questions regarding which picture was correct
with, “Which one do you think is right?” After completion of a set of three tasks
(emotion or natural discriminations), the child was asked if he or she needed to take a
break. If so, a three to five minute break began where the child was allowed to go to the
restroom, stand up and stretch, etc. If not, the experimenter began the next three
discrimination tasks. If the child was fatigued or did not want to keep participating, the
session was discontinued for the day and restarted on the next day of testing.
Procedure for the IED-II
After the child was finished with all six concept discrimination tasks, the measure
of language complexity was administered. There was a possible total composite score of
224 for the measure. The child was brought into the same room as was used in the
computer tasks and was seated either beside or cattycorner to the experimenter. The child
was given a new sticker bag to hold his or her stickers and was told that we were going to
play a word game. The first task that was administered was a receptive vocabulary test
(twenty-seven possible points) where the child was shown a page of nine images and
asked to point at the image that depicted the word produced by the experimenter. There
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were twenty-seven images total on three pages. The words for each page were presented
in a pseudo-random order for each participant, meaning that the experimenter asked the
child to point to the images in whatever order she determined, but not the same order
each time. The child received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of
performance.
The same twenty-seven images were used for the productive vocabulary measure,
but instead of pointing to the image as the experimenter labeled them, the child was asked
to name the images as the experimenter pointed at them. Again the images were pointed
to in a pseudo-random order. After completion of the initial task, the children were asked
twelve questions regarding the images on each page (six for page one and three for pages
two and three) to test for deeper comprehension of the meaning and utility of the
words/items. For example, the child was asked to point to all the pets shown on the first
page of images and asked which animals had two feet and two wings on the third page.
For both tasks, if the child was incorrect on three consecutive items, the testing was
discontinued. The questions were asked after the productive vocabulary task and were
added into that component score (thirty-nine possible points towards composite score).
The child received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance.
The child’s knowledge of plurals (-s) and present participles (-ing), prepositions
(up, down, in[side], and out[side]), and irregular plural nouns (feet and mice) were
measured by asking the child questions about images (eight possible points). For the
plural –s, the experimenter pointed to an image of two kittens and asked the child, “What
are these?” If the child responded with cats, kittens, kitty-cats, or kitties, the response was
counted as accurate. If the child responded with another animal, but with the correct
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plural suffix (-s), the experimenter asked them, “What are those again?” with a quizzical
look on her face to see if that would elicit the correct label, but the response was counted
as accurate and they moved on to the present participle –ing image. If the child did not
use the correct suffix, they were given the option to re-try with a second image depicting
two keys. The same process was followed with that image. Also, the same procedure was
followed for the images for the –ing suffix, except the question was phrased as what is
the person in the image doing. The first image was of a little boy splashing in a puddle,
and the child was asked, “What is this little boy doing?” Any response using the suffix –
ing was accepted as accurate. If the child did not use the proper suffix, the experimenter
asked a similar question about the second image of a little girl walking and holding a
doll. These images could add two possible points towards the composite score.
To assess preposition use, an image depicting a boy going upstairs and a girl
going downstairs was shown. The experimenter pointed to the boy in the picture and
asked the child, “What is this little boy doing?” Then the child was asked, as the
experimenter pointed to the girl, “What is this little girl doing?” The accurate response
was supposed to contain up and down. Each question was considered a separate response
contributing to the composite score. Next the experimenter directed the child’s attention
to a picture depicting one kitten inside a box and one kitten outside a box. This image
assessed the child’s use of the prepositions in(side) and out(side) by pointing to the kitten
in the box and asking the child, “Where is this kitten?” then pointing to the kitten outside
of the box and asking, “Where is THIS kitten?” If the child used the proper preposition, it
was counted as accurate and contributed two points towards the child’s composite score.
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The final part of this section examined the child’s use of irregular plural nouns.
The child was first shown an image of two sets of feet. The experimenter pointed to the
feet and asked the child, “What are these?” One point towards the composite score was
added if the child responded with the word “feet,” not foots, feets, or foot. The second
image depicted three mice, and the experimenter circled all three with her finger while
asking, “What are these?” If the child called them mice, not mouses or mouse, then a
point was added to their composite score. If the child called the animals rats, the
experimenter pointed at one of the mice and said, “This is a mouse, so what are these
called?” If the child persisted in calling the animals rats, the response was counted as
inaccurate. The child received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of
performance.
As a part of the child’s receptive and productive vocabulary score, the next task
assessed the child’s knowledge of parts of the body. For the receptive task, the
experimenter told the child that we are going to play a silly game where they pointed to
things or showed me things. The child was then asked to point to or show the
experimenter individual parts of their body. There were twenty-nine possible points
available for this section. The parts of the body used were as follows: eyes, nose, mouth,
hair, feet, ears, tongue, head, legs, arms, fingers, teeth, thumbs, toes, neck, stomach,
chest, back, knees, chin, fingernails, heels, ankles, jaw, shoulders, elbows, hips, wrists,
and waist. If the child missed three items consecutively, testing for this section was
discontinued. For the productive section of the parts of the body, the experimenter would
point to the part of the body she wanted the child to label and ask, “What is this?” All of
the same parts of the body were used as in the receptive section except tongue and teeth;
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therefore, this section contributed twenty-seven possible points towards the child’s
composite score. The same discontinue rule was used in the productive section. The child
received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance.
Also as a part of productive and receptive vocabulary, the next task measured
quantitative concepts. This measure included questions regarding the following
quantitative contrasts: big/little, one/one more, full/empty, heavy/light, tall/short, fat/thin,
fast/slow, all/none, long/short, large/small, deep/shallow, thick/thin, wide/narrow,
more/less, many/few, huge/tiny, and most/least. To assess the child’s comprehension of
the contrast between big and little, an image of two big cats and two little cats was shown
to the child. The experimenter asked, “Show me the big cat. Which cats are big?” If the
child pointed to the big cats, the response was counted as accurate. Then the experimenter
asked, “Show me the little cat. Which cats are little?” If the child pointed to the little cats,
the response was counted as accurate. This image was the only one provided by the
author.
The remaining contrasts were assessed using either a PowerPoint presentation
depicting images that fit the criterion provided by the author or by using real stimuli. For
instance, to assess one and one more, the experimenter placed four-six paper clips in front
of the child then asked the child, “Would you please hand me one of these?” If the child
handed the experimenter only one of the paper clips, the response was counted as
accurate. Then the experimenter asked the child, “Would you please hand me one more?”
If the child handed the experimenter only one more of the paper clips, the response was
counted as accurate.
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Some items were asked in order to measure receptive vocabulary while others
were asked in a way to assess the child’s ability to produce quantitative words. As an
example, to assess the child’s concepts of all versus none, the experimenter would ask the
child, “How many cars on the road have wheels?” If the child responded with an answer
containing the word “all,” the response was counted as correct. Then the experimenter
would ask them, emphasizing the silliness of the question, “How many cars on the road
have legs?” If the child’s answer contained the word “none” or words ”not any,” it was
counted as correct. An answer of “no” was not counted as correct as it is not a
quantitative term. If the child made two consecutive incorrect responses, testing was
discontinued for this section. In total, these items could contribute thirty-four possible
points towards the child’s composite score. The child received stickers after completion
of this task, regardless of performance.
In order to assess some of the more applied or practical aspects of language, the
classifying task examined the child’s understanding of the following sixteen semantic
categories: animals, toys, means of travel, clothes, foods, dishes, people, pets, numbers,
things to read, fruits, vegetables, tools, furniture, shapes, and musical instruments. Each
page contained twelve images, three of each semantic category. The experimenter would
then ask the child to point to all the category members on each page. In order for the
child’s response to be considered correct, he or she must have chosen either all three of
the category members or two of three of the category members. If the child chose none of
the three possible members or only one of the three members for two consecutive
categories, testing was discontinued for this section. The child could earn a possible

74
sixteen points towards his or her composite score in this section. The child received
stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance.
The next section also assessed the child’s practical language comprehension and
production. In this section, the child was asked what he or she should do given a specific
circumstance. There were fourteen questions including questions such as, “What do you
do when you are sleepy?” and “What should you do if you cut/get a booboo on your
finger?” The experimenter counted the child’s response as correct if they were
appropriate given the situation (e.g., “go take a nap” and “get a Band-Aid”). If the child
was inaccurate on two consecutive questions, testing was discontinued for this section.
The child received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance.
The final section was an additional measure of the child’s practical understanding
and utilization of language by assessing the child’s knowledge of the use of common
objects. There were two pages of images, one with eight images (chairs, cars, beds,
houses, pencils, dishes, coats, and stoves) and the second with seven images (book,
phone, scissors, key, refrigerator, airplane, and clock). To assess the child’s expressive
understanding, the experimenter would point to each image and ask the child, “Why do
we have __________?” The child was to respond with some function of the item depicted
in order for their response to be counted as accurate. If the child responded inaccurately
to three consecutive questions, testing was discontinued for the receptive component of
the task. After completion of the expressive component of this task, the child’s receptive
ability to indicate the item that matched the description of the use of each of the items
was measured. The experimenter would ask the child, “Show me what we (e.g., sleep
on).” This request was made for each of the items on the page in a pseudo-random order.
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The same discontinue rule was used for the receptive component. The child could earn
thirty possible points total towards their composite score during this task. The child
received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance.
Data Analysis
Variables in the Model
The dependent variable was performance, in the form of percent correct on each
of the three natural concept discrimination tasks and the three emotion concept
discrimination tasks. The within-subjects independent variables were type of stimulus
(natural, emotion) and level of abstraction (subordinate, basic, superordinate). Age,
gender, and composite language complexity score were the between subjects independent
variables.
Analyses for the Hypotheses
To test the main hypotheses a mixed model factorial ANOVA was conducted with
the specific predictor variables of interest for each hypothesis, and the dependent variable
entered in the model. As language complexity is a continuous variable, it was entered in
the model first as a covariate then a specific model was built which allowed for the
interactions between it and the other independent variables to be investigated. This
technique is highly utilized in social psychology research and forces SPSS to treat the
continuous variables as a discrete variable in the model (Wuensch & Everhart, 2006).
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Tests of the Language as an Augmenter Hypothesis
A mixed model factorial ANOVA of performance on the concept tasks with
language complexity, age, and sex as between subjects factors, and type of concept
(natural, emotion) and level of abstraction (subordinate, basic, and subordinate) as within
subjects factors indicated that, contrary to the language as an augmenter hypothesis, there
was no main effect of language complexity, F (2, 130) = 2.051, p = 0.137. There were
also no significant main effects of age, F (3, 65) = 0.681, p = 0.567, or sex, F (1, 65) =
0.628, p = 0.431. Refer to Appendix A for a full table of descriptive statistics for the
model. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for language complexity as a function of
sex. Based on these statistics, it is unlikely that the lack of effect of language complexity
is due to a lack of variability in the language complexity variable.
Table 1
Language complexity by sex.

Sex

Mean

Standard Deviation

Males

162.844

34.915

Females

167.191

40.164

Total

165.311

37.795

Figure 4 shows performance as a function of type of concept, level of abstraction, and sex
of the child.
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Figure 4. Performance as a function of type of concept, sex, and level of abstraction; A)
natural concepts, B) emotion concepts. Error bars represent the standard deviation. The
horizontal black line indicates chance level of performance of ten correct out of twenty
trials.
Interestingly, there was an interaction between concept type and sex of the
participant, F (1, 65) = 6.481, p = 0.013. Follow up ANOVAs for each concept type
including sex, language complexity, and levels of abstraction as variables, indicated that
there was no effect of sex on performance for the natural concept discriminations, F (1,
65) = 0.603, p = 0.44, whereas there was a main effect of sex on performance for the
emotion concepts, F (1, 65) = 4.133, p = 0.046, with females performing significantly
better (M = 10.635, SEM = 0.42) than males (M = 9.384, SEM = 0..463) at
discriminating emotions. Figure 5 graphically illustrates this relationship.
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Figure 5. Number correct by type of concept and sex. The error bars represent the
standard error. The black horizontal line indicates chance level performance at ten trials
correct out of twenty total trials.
Tests of the Circumplex Model of Emotions
Tests of the Circumplex Model for the Emotion Category Discrimination would
predict the best performance on the basic level concept discrimination (positive versus
negative). A repeated measures ANOVA of performance on the Emotion Concept Task
contrasting the three levels of abstraction (subordinate, basic, and superordinate – within
subjects factors) and including age and sex as between subjects factors indicated a lack of
support for the model, F(2, 146)=3.381, p=0.037, in that the best performance was
actually with the subordinate level discrimination (angry versus sad, M = 10.811, SD =
3.510), and lowest on the basic level discrimination (M = 9.446, SD = 2.445).
Post-hoc analyses, using Tukey’s least significant difference (LSD) tests,
indicated that performance at the superordinate level of abstraction differed significantly
from performance at the basic level of abstraction (LSD = 1.169, p = 0.027) with
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performance at the superordinate level of abstraction better than performance at the basic
level. Performance at the subordinate level also differed significantly from performance
at the basic level (LSD = -1.141 p = 0.022) with performance at the subordinate level
better than performance at the basic level. Taken together, the results provide some
support for the Innateness Universality Hypothesis. Of note, however, the only scores
that significantly differed from chance level performance (ten correct out of twenty trials)
using one-sample t-tests were three-year-olds’ superordinate level performance, t (41) =
2.423, p = 0.02, and four-year-olds’ subordinate level of performance, t (22) = 3.166, p =
0.004 when categorizing on the basis of emotions. Both were significantly higher than
chance level performance. Figure 6 graphically illustrates the relationship between
performance as a function of levels of abstraction in the emotion concept discriminations.
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Figure 6. Number correct by level of abstraction for the emotion concept discrimination
tasks, where the horizontal black line indicates chance level performance of ten correct
out of twenty total trials. The error bars represent the standard error.
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Natural Concept Discrimination Performance
One sample t-tests performed on the natural concept level discrimination
performances by age of the participants showed that only four-year-olds’ superordinate
level performance was significantly above chance, t (22) = 2.426, p = 0.024.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The language as an augmenter hypothesis suggests that language, when present
and intact, acts as a supplement to thought. Words provide anchors for concepts,
providing the organizational structure upon which a concept can be built (Gelman &
Markman, 1987; Plunkett et al., 2008; Wolff & Holmes, 2011; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998).
In keeping with this hypothesis, the current study predicted that a higher language
complexity score would predict higher performance on the concept discrimination tasks
regardless of age, sex, type of concept (natural or emotion), and level of abstraction
(subordinate, basic, and superordinate). However, the results provided no support for this
hypothesis, with no significant main effect of language on concept discrimination
performance for either the natural or emotion concept tasks.
Based on the current methodology where no words were provided for the
categories, supporters of the LRH could argue that the reason for the lack of an observed
relationship between language complexity and categorization could be due to the fact that
children need a label upon which to construct the concept (Lindquist et al., 2006; Johnson
et al., 1992; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Perhaps, language cannot
be as readily used as an augmenter unless it is explicitly present during the task itself.
Even if the child has the word in their verbal repertoire, it could be argued that in order to
properly assess the effect of language on concept formation, the word anchoring the
concept should be provided to the child before the task, allowing for a more direct test of
the hypothesis. The effect of providing a verbal label could easily be assessed if, in
addition to the IED-II language measures, one group of children is provided with the
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corresponding verbal label for the categories prior to beginning each concept
discrimination task. A control group would not be provided with verbal labels, as was the
case for the current participants. If language was used as an augmenter, aiding in the
discrimination and formation of concepts, the performance of the group given the labels
for the categories should be greater than performance of the group not provided with the
labels.
Alternatively, children could be asked to generate labels themselves during the
task in an experimental group, and performance could be compared based on the facility
and/or accuracy with which they performed the labeling task. One could also compare the
performance of children with and without the capacity to generate labels, but it would be
difficult to do so without the confound of age or other developmental delays. By the
language as an augmenter hypothesis, being able to generate labels for the images could
help facilitate the concept discrimination as the labels could provide an anchoring
structure upon which to build the concept (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Future work should
investigate these possibilities.
It is also possible that language could play far less of a role than would be
suggested by the LRH and the language as an augmenter hypothesis. The evidence from
nonhuman animals, children with ASDs, and children born deaf without exposure to sign
language suggests that natural concept formation is possible without linguistic influence
(e.g., Gasteb et al., 2006; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988).
Premack (1983) suggested that the capacity for a symbolic system endows humans, and
perhaps symbol- trained animals, with the unique ability to think in abstract terms,
indicating that nonhuman animals should not be able to form abstract, superordinate level
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categories. Research has indicated, however, that several species of nonhuman animals
can, indeed form superordinate level categories (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998; Roberts &
Mazmanian, 1988; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002; Vonk et al., 2012), suggesting that
language may not be as necessary as Premack (1983) and supporters of the LRH
implicate. In addition, supporters of the IUH and the emotion recognition system assert
that emotion discrimination is present and intact from birth, downplaying the impact of
linguistic input on the ability to judge emotion based on facial expression alone (Ekman,
1993; Izard, 1994). The fact that no relationship was found between language complexity
and concept formation lends some support to the idea that concept formation, for both
natural and emotion categories, could be an innate capacity impacted by experience with
the environment and less reliant on language than is suggested by supporters of the LRH
and the language as an augmenter hypothesis (Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Mandler,
1992).
One interesting interaction between concept type and sex emerged from the data
whereby females scored significantly higher on the emotion concept discriminations than
males. These results are supported by findings suggesting an early difference in the
processing of facial expressions, where females are better able to decode and process
emotions based on facial expressions and at an earlier age than males (Boyatzis, Chazan,
& Ting, 1993; McClure, 2000; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). These early differences in facial
expression processing could be explained from a socialization perspective, suggesting
that parents and society, at least in western societies, place greater emphasis on emotional
sensitivity and responsiveness for females in comparison to males. Males experience a
less emotionally enriched environment from birth onwards in comparison to females
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(McClure, 2000; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). From an evolutionary perspective, as females
tend to be the primary caretakers of infants, they should have evolved specialized skills to
aid in the survival of these infants. A very important skill for survival as social primates
is the use, recognition, and interpretation of facial expressions as they serve as important
nonverbal communicative cues from birth onwards (Babchuk, Hames, & Thompson,
1985; Hamson, van Anders, & Mullin, 2006). Therefore, the current results, framed in a
social and evolutionary perspective, appear to support previous findings, suggesting a
female superiority for emotion recognition based on facial expressions.
Exploring performance on the emotion concepts further, the tenets of the
Circumplex model of emotions were tested. The Circumplex model of emotions (Russell
& Bullock, 1985) suggests that emotion categories based on different facial expressions
fall into two bipolar dimensions based on valence (pleasure-displeasure) and vary in
degree of arousal early in life. This model is an LRH model in that it is argued that
exposure to language (learning the words for the different emotions) then differentiates
the categories, creating the fully discriminated emotions we have as adults (Carroll &
Russell, 1996; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003,
2008, 2010). In contrast to this model, the IUH suggests that emotion recognition based
on facial expressions is an innate capacity based on the possession of an emotion
recognition system that is present and intact from birth (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1994).
The current project tested the premise of the Circumplex model that emotion
categories begin in undifferentiated, valence- based categories of pleasure and
displeasure by establishing the basic level category of positive (happiness and surprise)
and negative (anger and sadness) emotions. If the Circumplex model is an accurate
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depiction of early emotion concepts, the results should have shown the best performance
for the basic level discrimination. In contrast, the results showed that the best
performance was obtained with the subordinate level discrimination of anger versus
sadness. Importantly, post-hoc analyses indicated that the basic level category differed
significantly from both the subordinate and superordinate level categories. These results
indicate that, even at very young ages (two to five years), emotion concepts, specifically
the negative emotions of anger and sadness, appear to be differentiated, providing some
support for the IUH and the emotion recognition system. More work should be done to
examine discriminations between all basic emotions. Evolutionarily speaking, having a
quick, efficient method for interpreting emotional states from birth would be adaptive in a
social species. Through facial expressions, humans have an efficient means for conveying
information about affect without the necessity of language (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1994).
The current study provided a direct test of the Circumplex model utilizing a nonverbal
task, methodology that is unique in the current literature.
In using a nonverbal task, the current study allows for assessing concept
discrimination ability independently of language ability. Many other concept
discrimination tasks, both for natural and emotion concepts (e.g., Carroll & Russell,
1996; Gelman & Markman, 1987; Rosch et al., 1976; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Russell &
Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008, 2010) relied heavily on both receptive and
expressive language abilities. The children were given fairly complex verbal instructions
prior to the tasks and many tasks required the children to respond verbally. The current
study differentiates itself by using limited verbal instructions and requiring nonverbal
responses from the child. These aspects of the task support its utilization with very young
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children, and children with limited verbal abilities. An additional benefit to a nonverbal
task is that it allows for more direct comparisons of abilities between humans and
nonhuman animals. This basic task has been successfully utilized with nonhuman animals
(Vonk et al., 2012; 2013; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 2004). In the nonhuman animal
studies, the animals were tested continuously until they reached a set criterion at which
point they were provided with a transfer task. Here, the children participated in only a
single session to test for spontaneous rather than learned abilities. The methodology
could easily be adapted to allow for direct comparisons to be made. Truly comparative
methodologies are rare, but are necessary for understanding the phylogeny of cognition.
Although the inclusion of a nonverbal concept task is a benefit of the current
study, it also has a downside. The children’s scores were on average close to chance level
performance (ten out of twenty trials correct). One-way t-tests showed that the only
performances that were significantly above chance level performance were: three-yearolds’ performance on the emotion superordinate level discrimination (emotion versus
neutral) and four-year-olds’ performance on the natural superordinate level
discrimination (animals versus nonanimals) and the emotion concrete level
discrimination (anger versus sadness). These scores indicate that the children did not
successfully discriminate the concepts. It could be that the tasks, without explicit
instructions, were too difficult for the age range tested. It could also be that if the children
were given more sessions of the task, they could eventually discriminate the concepts at
levels significantly above chance, but it is important to note that I was specifically
interested in their spontaneous ability to discriminate the concepts. Allowing them to
learn to discriminate the concepts would not be relevant to the main goal of the current
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study. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, providing children with explicit
instructions prior to completing the tasks (i.e., labeling the categories) could be extremely
interesting and may more directly test the question asked by the current study, but doing
so would also impact how the child responds, moving away from innate ability and
looking more at a derived skill. The current methodology allows for the investigation of
children’s innate ability to discriminate concepts as it relates to their language abilities.
An additional strength of the current study is the utilization of language
complexity as the measure of language ability instead of focusing on the child’s receptive
and expressive language ability only. Human language is, arguably, the most complex
system of communication in the animal kingdom; it is far more than simply
understanding and producing labels for objects. By utilizing a more inclusive language
measure, the variable becomes more representative of the child’s actual language ability,
increasing the external validity of the measure. In utilizing language complexity instead
of more traditional measures, more complex analyses of the role of language in cognitive
processes could be made.
Also increasing the external validity of the study is the use of facial expressions
that were not overly standardized or computer-generated prototypical examples.
Although examining processing of artificial and prototypical facial expressions has its
place in the study of facial expression processing, the facial expressions that humans
encounter on a daily basis are not prototypical or perfect examples of the facial
configurations for each emotion. They are spontaneous expressions of emotion that can
be both true depictions of the emotional state of the individual or misleading expressions
meant to deceive the receiver of the information (Izard, 1994). The images used in this
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study were naturalistic photographs gathered from internet search sites (e.g., Google
Image) and judged as representing the intended emotion by laypeople (college
undergraduates). These facial expressions could be more accurate representations of what
children experience in their everyday lives relative to prototypical and/or artificial facial
expressions, potentially providing a better measure of their abilities to judge emotions
based on facial expressions.
Although the current study failed to find a significant relationship between
children’s language complexity and their concept discrimination abilities, it is possible
that children’s language abilities have less of an impact than does the language that they
hear in their environments, specifically from their parents/caregivers. Research has
indicated that parental, specifically maternal, language use has an effect on the child’s
theory of mind (Cheung, 2010; de Rosnay et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2000) and emotion
understanding (de Rosnay et al., 2004; Martin & Green, 2005; Mcquaid et al., 2007).
Less is known about the impact of parental language use on natural concept formation.
Future research should investigate the role of parental language use on natural concept
formation in children. There could be sex differences in the types of labels used more
frequently by parents. It could be that parents use more natural category labels when
interacting with male children whereas they might use more emotion labels when
interacting with female children, which could also help to explain the sex differences
found in the current study. This possibility has been supported by research conducted
with emotion recognition showing that mothers tend to use more elaborate emotion
language with female children in comparison to male children (Cervantes & Callanan,
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1998; Martin & Green, 2005). Less is known about natural categories, necessitating
further investigation.
The main finding of this study is that language complexity appears to have no
significant relationship to concept discrimination in young children - results that
contradict the language as an augmenter hypothesis set forth by supporters of the LRH.
These results provide some support for the arguments that the ability to organize
information into concepts is an innate skill, not dependent on language (Cimpain &
Erikson, 2012). The results also support the bottom-up argument for the formation of
concepts, suggesting that children actively build concepts from perceptual features as
they are perceiving the world (Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Mandler, 1992). Perceptual
features might play a more dominant role in concept formation for very young children,
in contrast to linguistic input.
Despite the lack of relationship between language and concept formation found in
this study, I hesitate to state that there is no relationship between language and concept
formation. Language is a powerful force in a child’s life; children are exposed to it from
the time their brains can perceive auditory information in utero and throughout their lives.
It is possible that while perceptual features dominate how children form concepts early in
life, that exposure to language could shape these concepts as the child develops. For more
abstract concepts that involve less easily observable perceptual differences, language
could play a stronger role in helping to anchor those concepts than for concepts easily
formed by perceptual similarity (Vonk & Povinelli, 2006). Also for relational concepts,
concepts formed by sharing common relational structures instead of common properties
(e.g., a bird and a nest), language appears to help point out those underlying common
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structures for young children (Bandurski & Galkowski, 2004; Gentner, Anggoro, &
Klibanoff, 2011; Gentner & Kurtz, 2005). These findings suggest that we have merely
just begun to scratch the surface of language’s role in concept formation, paving the way
for a wide range of future investigations.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE MODEL

Natural
Subordinate

Basic

Superordinate

2

8.667 (2.082)

5.667 (3.055)

14.0 (2.646)

3

9.563 (1.504)

10.625 (2.217)

10.563 (3.54)

4

8.636 (2.292)

9.364 (2.618)

12.546 (4.108)

5

11.5 (2.121)

10.5 (2.121)

10.0 (1.414)

2

8.50 (2.121)

8.0 (1.414)

9.0 (1.414)

3

10.217 (3.133)

9.782 (2.73)

10.565 (2.313)

4

10.083 (2.843)

9.667 (2.103)

11.5 (3.92)

5

9.8 (1.924)

8.6 (1.817)

10.6 (3.578)

9.716 (2.502)

9.608 (2.536)

11.095 (3.282)

Emotion
Subordinate

Basic

Superordinate

2

9.0 (1.0)

9.0 (0.0)

10.333 (1.528)

3

10.375 (3.722)

9.75 (1.915)

9.813 (2.613)

4

11.546 (3.446)

8.182 (2.562)

9.546 (2.382)

5

8.5 (0.707)

8.5 (0.707)

9.0 (5.657)

2

8.5 (0.707)

10.5 (0.707)

11.0 (0.0)

3

10.174 (3.762)

9.696 (2.324)

11.652 (2.822)

4

12.583 (2.937)

10.167 (3.639)

11.583 (2.314)

5

12.2 (4.087)

8.6 (1.949)

11.6 (1.949)

10.811 (3.51)

9.446 (2.445)

10.784 (2.65)

Age
Males

Females

Total
Age
Males

Females

Total

*Note: The statistics presented are in the following format: mean (standard deviation).
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APPENDIX B
CONSENT PACK GIVEN TO PARENTS

Letter to Parents from Facilities
October	
  22,	
  2013	
  
	
  
Dear	
  Parents,	
  
	
  
As	
  you	
  all	
  know,	
  we	
  take	
  our	
  positions	
  as	
  caregivers/educators	
  of	
  your	
  children	
  
very	
  seriously	
  and	
  we	
  love	
  our	
  work.	
  We	
  are	
  continually	
  updating	
  and	
  improving	
  
our	
  practices	
  and	
  materials	
  to	
  provide	
  the	
  best	
  for	
  your	
  children’s	
  growth	
  and	
  
development.	
  
	
  
That	
  said,	
  Stephanie	
  E.	
  Jett	
  is	
  a	
  Doctoral	
  Student	
  in	
  the	
  department	
  of	
  Psychology	
  at	
  
the	
  University	
  of	
  Southern	
  Mississippi,	
  who	
  is	
  conducting	
  a	
  dissertation	
  in	
  the	
  area	
  
of	
  cognitive	
  development.	
  She	
  recently	
  approached	
  us	
  with	
  a	
  research	
  idea	
  for	
  our	
  
children.	
  We	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  invite	
  your	
  child	
  to	
  participate	
  in	
  two	
  	
  30-‐40	
  minute	
  (on	
  
average),	
  one-‐on-‐one	
  session	
  to	
  learn	
  about	
  their	
  understanding	
  of	
  natural	
  and	
  
emotion	
  concepts/categories	
  and	
  how	
  these	
  abilities	
  interact	
  with	
  language.	
  It	
  is	
  
suspected	
  that	
  language	
  affects	
  how	
  early	
  language	
  learners	
  (two-‐	
  to	
  five-‐year-‐olds)	
  
group	
  things	
  into	
  categories,	
  but	
  the	
  particular	
  aspects	
  of	
  language	
  that	
  contribute	
  
to	
  this	
  categorization	
  remains	
  unclear.	
  If	
  we	
  can	
  better	
  understand	
  this	
  relationship	
  
between	
  language	
  and	
  concepts,	
  we	
  will	
  better	
  understand	
  how	
  concepts	
  for	
  natural	
  
categories	
  and	
  emotions	
  are	
  formed	
  and	
  utilized.	
  Please	
  see	
  the	
  attached	
  University	
  
of	
  Southern	
  Mississippi	
  consent	
  form	
  with	
  more	
  of	
  the	
  research	
  specifics	
  and	
  
procedures.	
  
	
  
Our	
  center	
  approves	
  the	
  participation	
  of	
  your	
  child	
  in	
  these	
  computer-‐testing	
  
sessions.	
  The	
  sessions	
  will	
  take	
  place	
  during	
  the	
  regular	
  school	
  time	
  in	
  an	
  area	
  
adjacent	
  to	
  the	
  classroom	
  over	
  the	
  next	
  several	
  weeks.	
  Your	
  child	
  will	
  not	
  miss	
  any	
  
free	
  or	
  outside	
  play	
  time,	
  or	
  any	
  critical	
  testing	
  material.	
  Feel	
  free	
  to	
  contact	
  
Stephanie	
  or	
  her	
  supervisor,	
  Dr.	
  Heidi	
  Lyn,	
  with	
  any	
  questions	
  about	
  the	
  project	
  
(email:	
  stephanie.jett@eagles.usm.edu	
  or	
  cell:	
  251-‐490-‐3433;	
  Dr.	
  Lyn	
  email:	
  
heidi.lyn@usm.edu	
  or	
  office:	
  228.214.3234).	
  
	
  
If	
  you	
  would	
  like	
  your	
  child	
  to	
  participate,	
  please	
  sign	
  the	
  attached	
  consent	
  form	
  
allowing	
  your	
  child	
  to	
  participate	
  and	
  return	
  to	
  us	
  this	
  week.	
  
	
  
Thank	
  you	
  in	
  advance	
  for	
  your	
  assistance.	
  
	
  
________________________________________	
  	
  
______________________________________________	
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Stephanie	
  E.	
  Jett,	
  M.S.	
  
Center/School	
  Director	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Experimental	
  Psychology	
  Ph.D.	
  
Program	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Department	
  of	
  Psychology	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
University	
  of	
  Southern	
  Mississippi	
  
	
  
PLEASE	
  KEEP	
  THIS	
  PORTION	
  FOR	
  YOUR	
  RECORDS	
  
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Title of Research Project: LNEC12
Project Contact: Stephanie E. Jett, M.S., Experimental Psychology Ph.D. Program, The University of
Southern Mississippi. 251-490-3433 or stephanie.jett@eagles.usm.edu.
Purpose of the Project: The purpose of this work is to investigate the role of language complexity on
natural and emotion concept formation in early language learners (two- to five-year-olds). Using six (three
natural and three emotion) tasks presented on a touch screen computer, children will be asked to choose
one of two images that are presented simultaneously that represent different concepts. Only one concept
will be considered correct. Three of the tasks will present the children with pictures of different animals
and three tasks will present them with pictures of human emotion expressions. We are interested in how
language complexity might predict performance on these categorization tasks. To assess language
complexity we your child will be given an abbreviated version of the Brigance Early Childhood Screen II.
This test measures aspects of language such as receptive and productive vocabulary, irregular noun use,
quantity terms, etc. and will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of language’s effects on
concept formation.
Procedures: Your child will be asked to complete the six concept discrimination tasks described above on a
touch screen computer. I will explain the tasks by stating that, “We are going to play a picture game on the
computer. Your job is to choose the picture that makes the computer beep (correct choice).” All six tasks
should take approximately 30-40 minutes to complete. Additionally, the Brigance will be administered in a
separate session after completion of the computer tasks and will take approximately 20-30 minutes to
complete. The child will be allowed to stop participating at any point and will not be penalized in any way.
If the child does not complete all the tasks in one session, an additional session may be conducted to finish
the remaining tasks if the child agrees to continue to participate. Performance on these tasks will not be
used in any way to evaluate your child’s intelligence or academic performance. These two testing sessions
will be conducted one-on-one with me in an office/classroom adjacent to the classroom area during regular
school hours.
Potential Risks or Discomforts: The risks involved for your child participating in the project are negligible.
It is expected that they will find the tasks fun to complete. There is a chance they become discouraged if
they select the wrong choices. However, they will be allowed to stop at any time if participating in the tasks
makes them uncomfortable or if they refuse to respond.
Potential Benefits: Your child should find the tasks fun to complete. Their responses are not graded by the
teachers at ____________________, nor will they be used in any kind of assessment of their academic
progress. However, your child’s participation will allow psychologists to better understand the particular
way that language impacts the formation of these concepts.
Voluntary Participation: The participation of the children is entirely voluntary, and participants can
withdraw from the project at any time. Children will be asked to print their name or form some kind of
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identifying mark on an assent form to indicate their intent to participate. Children will be told the purpose
of the project and will be given the opportunity to ask questions and take breaks at any point during the
one-on-one session which will last, on average, 30-40 minutes. The session to administer the Brigance
should take on average, 20-30 minutes. Additionally, you, as the parent, may refuse to respond to any
questions on the demographic survey and/or withdraw your participation at any time without penalty for
you or your child.
Protection of Confidentiality: All of the information that is collected will be kept strictly confidential. An
ID number will be created for your child at the beginning of the study. All data is stored according to the
ID #, not participant names. At the conclusion of data collection for this study, all identifying information
will be deleted. Data gathered from the present study will be stored in a secure location for six years, at
which time it will be destroyed. THE DATA MAY BE VIEWED BY THE PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR
AND HER MENTOR. ONCE RESULTS HAVE BEEN LINKED FROM AGGREGATE FILES,
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION WILL BE REMOVED, SUCH THAT NO ONE WILL VIEW NAMES
ASSOCIATED WITH THE DATA. When information is used in research reports and journal articles, it is
only done in a way that no one could know that the information is about any specific student.
PLEASE KEEP THIS PORTION FOR YOUR RECORDS

This project has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Protection Review Committee,
which ensures that research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations.
Any questions or concerns about rights as a research subject should be directed to the
chair of the Institutional Review Board, The University of Southern Mississippi, 118
College Drive Box #5147, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, (601) 266-6820.
I HAVE BEEN FULLY INFORMED OF THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED PROCEDURES
WITH THEIR POSSIBLE BENEFITS AND RISKS, AND I GIVE PERMISSION FOR
THE PARTICIPATION OF MY CHILD.
Signature _______________________________________ Date ___________________
Printed Parent Name ________________________________
Name of Child _____________________________________
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION TO THE FACILITY
Parent Child Questionnaire for LNEC12 Project
*NECESSARY INFORMATION:

*Child’s Name _________________________*Date of Birth____________________
*Languages Spoken at
Home:___________________________________________________________
*Does your child have any diagnosed language disorders (circle)? Yes or

No

If yes, please explain:_____________________________________________________
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*Does your child have any diagnosed intellectual disorders (circle)? Yes or

No

If yes, please explain:_____________________________________________________
Optional Information:
Please indicate (by circling the appropriate response) your child’s birth order:
a) Only child
d) Third child
b) First child
e) Fourth child
c) Second child
f) Other: Explain
______________________________________________________________
How many brothers and sisters (siblings) does your child have? Please list the ages of each:
a) Full siblings and their ages: ______________________________________________
b) Half siblings and their ages: _____________________________________________
Please indicate the living arrangements in your home:
a) Single mother home
c) Two parent home
b) Single father home
d) Shared custody between parents
e) Other: Explain ________________________________________________________
What is your annual household income?
a) Below $30,000
b) $30,000 - $50,000
c) $50,100 - $70,000

d) $70,100 - $90,000
e) Above $90,000

What is the ethnic background of your child?
a)
b)
c)
f)

Caucasian (white)
d) Asian
African American
e) Native American
Hispanic
Other: Explain________________________________________________________

PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION TO THE FACILITY
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APPENDIX C
INFORMED ASSENT DOCUMENT GIVEN TO PARTICIPANTS

University of Southern Mississippi
Statement of Informed Assent
Participant’s Name __________________________________
The purpose of these activities is to help me learn more about you and how you
think, so we can understand more about your brain. I am going to play some picture
games with you on the computer that will show me how you put things into groups.
Some children may feel funny about doing some of these tasks. This is ok. You
do not have to play the games if you do not want to. You can decide to stop working with
me at any time, or to take a break whenever you want to. I will let you take a break
between the different tasks. Also, the choices you make will not be shown to your
teachers, parents, or friends. They will be completely private.
If you agree to help us with this study, please print your name on the line below.

___________________________________
Your Name

______________________________
Date
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APPENDIX D
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION
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APPENDIX E
PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE COPYRIGHTED ILLUSTRATIONS

On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:45 AM, Stephanie Jett <stephanie.e.jett@gmail.com> wrote:
Thank you, Dr. Russell! I very much appreciate it!
Stephanie
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:42 AM, James Russell <james.russell@bc.edu> wrote:
I am delighted to have you use the figures.
James A. Russell
Department of Psychology
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA USA
tel 617 552 4546
fax 617 552 0523
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:40 PM, Stephanie Jett <stephanie.e.jett@gmail.com> wrote:
Hello Dr. Russell,
My name is Stephanie Jett and I have just completed defending my dissertation
at the University of Southern Mississippi under the direction of Dr. Jennifer
Vonk (Oakland University, Michigan) and Dr. Heidi Lyn (University of Southern
Mississippi). My dissertation is on the effects of language on natural and emotion
concept formation and I based one of my hypotheses on the Circumplex Model of
emotion recognition. I am emailing you first, to express my admiration of your
work, and secondly to ask permission to use a figure from two of your
manuscripts in my dissertation. I would like to use Figure 1 from Russell and
Bullock (1985, p. 1291), Figure 3 from Russell and Widen (2002, p. 38), and
Figure 2 from Widen and Russell (2008, p.294). Please let me know as soon as
possible if I can utilize the figure. I sincerely appreciate your time and assistance!
Take care!
Stephanie E. Jett, M.S.
Comparative Cognition and Communication Lab
University of Southern Mississippi Gulf Coast
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